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ÖZET 
 
Türkiye‟nin Avrupa Birliği‟ne giriş sürecinde kimliğinde ve bu kimliği 
yansıtmasında meydana gelen değişim üç başlıkta incelenmiştir: Birey düzeyi, 
devlet düzeyi ve sistem düzeyi.  Birinci düzeyde liderlerden kaynaklanan durum, 
söylem analizi ile incelenmiştir. İkinci düzeyde devletin politik kültüründen 
bahsedilmiş, üç kurum (Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 
Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı) incelenerek AB ilişkilerindeki 
değişimin devlet düzeyindeki yansımaları gösterilmiştir. Üçüncü düzeyde ise 
sistemden kaynaklanan değişikliklerin Türkiye‟nin kimliksel açıdan farklı bir 
tutum izlemesine yol açtığı belirtilmiş, bölgesel analizler yapılarak Türkiye‟nin 
yumuşak gücüne atıfta bulunulmuştur. Sonuç olarak Türkiye‟nin kimliğindeki 
değişimin tek boyutlu analizlerle tam olarak anlaşılmayacağına değinilmiş, ileriye 
yönelik tahminlerde bulunulmuştur. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Identity of Turkey has become one of the most discussed issues in academia, in 
internal affairs and in world politics especially in the last decade. Turkey‟s 
accession to European Union has been debated mostly via the identity of Turkey, 
alongside with the economic or legal terms. In the EU accession period, Turkey‟s 
stance with regard to its identity discourse has changed. In the previous decades, 
Turkey has been trying to prove how European she is. Today, there exists a 
different discourse which underlines the differences of Turkey and Europe; rather 
than stressing commonalities. This study tries to explain the reasons of the change 
of Turkey‟s stance in the post-Helsinki period with regard to its identity position 
towards European Union. In doing so, Kenneth Waltz‟s „Levels of Analysis‟ 
approach is used as a model. The reasons of the change are explained in three 
levels. In individual level, the effect of AKP government is dealt, with specific 
emphasis on the discourses of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu. In state level, the reasons which 
are stemmed from the very identity of state is put forward. Lastly, the systemic 
level explores the changes of the system and its reflections on the Turkish identity 
projection. Turkey‟s increasing soft power emerges as a significant factor within 
systemic analysis. It is acquired is that one dimensional explanations are not 
adequate to obtain a full understanding of Turkey‟s position towards EU. 
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Explaining the Change in Turkey’s Identity Question in the  
European Union Accession Process: 
A Levels of Analysis Approach 
 
Introduction 
 
The relations between Turkey and European Union (EU) started in 1959 with Turkey‟s 
application to join the European Economic Community.Since then, there have always been 
debates about the thorny road of Turkey and the relations have not been so smooth. In some 
periods, the relations tensed up due to the political agenda of the day. Some phases were called 
as honeymoon between Turkey and EU, when occurred progress in the negotiations. Demands 
of EU have always created arguments inside Turkey, both with regard to the statesmen and in 
the eyes of the public. However, it might not be wrong to state that in recent years Turkey‟s 
relationship with EU had never been discussed that intensively from the identical bases.  The 
economic and political challenges that Turkey faces – once regarded as vital problems -, are 
now seems to be in the back stage. Rather, identity issues are on the scene. In Turkey and also 
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in European states; not only in the academia, but also in the political stage, Turkey‟s identity is 
projected as playing the leading role in EU membership process.  
The very identity of Turkey is also subject to a debate. There occurred a literature about 
the compatibility of Turkey‟s identity to EU identity. Scholars and politicians like Valery 
Giscard D‟Estang, Richard Wagner, Michael Glos, Alain Besançon,  Agustin Jose Menendez 
and Sylvie Goulard think that Turkish identity is not compatible with European identity. They 
usually refer to the incompatibility of culture, history and religion of Turkey, with strong 
emphasis on Ancient Greek and Roman heritage of Europe. The incompability of Turkey‟s 
identity was not a new claim though. Turkey, being exposed to such assertions, has historically 
tried to defend itself as being Western as the EU member states. Turkey has developed a 
discourse affirming that Turkey is and has been a secular country with the 1923 reforms. 
Turkey liked to use the rhetoric of being in the crossroads of Europe and Asia. She has tried to 
project her Western identity, secular character and her modern face. Turkey, in the road for EU 
accession, has tried to locate itself as „being same as the European counterparts‟. Previous 
statesmen used to use the rhetoric of being like European states, embracing Western values and 
determination to pursue the modernization process. İsmail Cem was a leader who accepted the 
previous mindset of Turkey towards Europe. He stated that “We have been trying to be 
European, counted as Europeans. Accept us, make us Europeans, we are Europeans, we will be 
Europeans… We have created unnecessary inferiority complexes to ourselves”1 
However, when we came to 2000s, it seems that there occurred a change in the rhetoric 
of the Turkish identity. Especially nowadays (in 2011), the most common words that we hear 
on television news or in newspapers are the catch phrases of the „new‟ Turkish foreign policy. 
Starting with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government, continuing with Ahmet Davutoğlu‟s being 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, phrases like „shift of axis, Alliance of Civilizations, Turkey being 
                                                             
1 "Avrupa Türkiye'yi Göze Alamıyor", Milliyet, 23 November 1997 
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model for Muslim world, being leader of the Arab world‟ started to be used much more 
frequently. For some statesmen and scholars, Turkey is going through a new phase and has a 
brand new foreign policy while some others think that there are continuities with the previous 
governments‟ foreign policy. Leaving aside questioning whether there is a completely new 
foreign policy or not; it seems that there occurred changes in Turkey‟s identity, at least in the 
projection of it. 
This research came into being by questioning whether there is really a change in the 
pattern of projecting the identity of Turkey. The aim of the research is to find out the changes 
in the discourse of the Turkey‟s identity in the EU membership process. The research question 
is “Is there an explicit shift in Turkish identity and what are the reasons of such change?” The 
hypothesis is that there is a shift in the identity of Turkey towards EU countries. After 2000s, 
there appeared a different discourse about the Turkish identity towards EU: Turkey has a 
different identity from the European states. Turkey is a Muslim country. Turkey has 
geographical and historical ties with Middle East and Arab world, which cannot be neglected in 
foreign policy making. Turkey belongs to another civilization. Turkey is different and that 
should be the very reason to be part of EU. Turkey should be the EU member because of the 
very distinguishing character of it.  
This discursive shift is not only seen in the political arena, but it is reflected to the 
academia. Jens Alber, Fuat Keyman, Levent Kırval, Gerard Delanty, Nedret Kuran-Burçoğlu 
and Wim Duisehberg,  are the ones who hold the view that Turkish identity and EU identity are 
different and that‟s why Turkey should become a member of  EU. The proponents of such view 
usually refer Turkey as a model for Muslim world or a legitimating factor for EU, which 
attributes the universality of the Enlightenment values to itself. 
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This study is going to analyze the change in the identity policy of Turkey in the EU 
accession period. In doing so, prominent neorealist scholar Kenneth Waltz‟s “levels of 
analysis” approach will be applied. Waltz‟s levels of analysis approach emerged from 
questioning the reasons of war. This time, the shift which underlines the distinctive character of 
Turkey is going to be examined with this approach. There are three levels in the analysis: 
individual level, state level and international level.
2
  Waltz states that war is linked to the 
character of individual leaders, characteristics of states and societies and to the character of the 
international system. In short, Waltz‟s levels of analysis provides a three dimensional approach 
and it can be used not only to explain the war, but various issues in world politics. 
The research is going to encompass all three levels in explaining the shift in identity 
issues. The individual level of the shift in the Turkish identity towards EU will be studied 
through the discourses of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs  Ahmet Davutoğlu. The method in reflecting their stance toward the EU will be 
„discourse analysis‟. The main topic of interest is to reveal the underlying meaning that may be 
assumed or played out within the conversation or text. It is related with the tools and strategies 
people use when engaged in communication, such as use of metaphors, choice of particular 
words etc. Apart from the speeches of the leaders, recent developments in the foreign policy 
agenda will certainly be mentioned. Alliance of Civilizations, Caricature Crisis, Davos Crisis, 
elimination of visas with various countries, official visit of the leaders will be given specific 
importance. 
With regard to the state level, three points will be presented as the factors for the 
identity shift. Embracing different modernities, Euro-skepticism and Turkey‟s economic 
improvement can be counted as the factors that pave the way for such shift. In order to analyze 
the state‟s stance, Turkish Secretariat General for EU Affairs (SGEU) will be examined with a 
                                                             
2 Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) 
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particular emphasis on “EU Communication Strategy 2010”3 and “EU Strategy for Turkey‟s 
Accession 2010
4” documents. Another institution that is going to be studied will be the recently 
opened Yunus Emre Institute. The aim of the Yunus Emre Institute is to encourage learning 
Turkish language, culture and history especially in abroad. The analysis will be based on the 
first hand information obtained through the interview with the President of the Insititute Ali 
Fuat Bilkan and on the information on the official web site of the institution. Third institution is 
the Presidency of Turks and Related Communities Abroad. It is newly opened under the Prime 
Ministry. The works of the institution is affiliated with creating a powerful Turkish diaspora via 
vitalizing the cultural, historical and ethnic relations with various nations. Its aims and the 
scope of activities worth studying. 
Third dimension is the systemic level in which Turkey‟s position in the international 
arena will be discussed. After the collapse of the bipolar world, the importance of being the 
reliable „Western partner‟ in NATO for Turkey diminished. After the end of the Soviet threat, 
hard security issues started to draw away from the international political scene compared to the 
previous era. The drastic changes after the end of the Cold War pave the way for new positions 
for states. Such context provided Turkey to redefine its role in the international system and to 
enlarge its sphere of influence with its soft power. Turkey‟s trade and economic ties enhanced 
with its Black Sea neighbors and Central Asia states and Turkey took steps to overcome its 
„isolation‟ and security concerns. Moreover, the system enabled Turkey a wider space of 
manoeuver in the Middle Eastern politics. Turkey started to involve into the Arab politics more 
actively. Rather than refraining from being part of the Middle East, Turkey started to seek the 
ways to be a „model‟ for the region in terms of combining democratic values and Islam 
alongside with flourishing economic performance. 
                                                             
3Secretariat General for European Union, “Türkiye‟nin Avrupa Birliği İletişim Stratejisi”[Turkey‟s 
Communication Strategy of EU] (Ankara: January 2010)  
4 Secretariat General for European Union, “Türkiye‟nin Katılım Süreci için Avrupa Birliği Stratejisi” [Turkey‟s 
EU Strategy for Accession Period] (Ankara: December 2010) 
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To sum up, the hypothesis of this research is that there is a change in the identity policy 
of Turkey towards EU. The thesis will try to find an answer to the questions of „where do we 
see such change and what are the reasons for this discursive shift?‟ After examining all three 
levels, the outcome of the research came forward is that the change in the identity policy of 
Turkey is seen in all the levels. In other words, the reason of the change in Turkey‟s identity 
cannot be explained solely by the conservative background of the government leaders, nor it 
can be depended on the state‟s character or the world politics. To acquire a comprehensive 
understanding, one should study all the levels.  
 
Levels of Analysis 
Being one of the most prominent International Relations scholars, Professor Kenneth Waltz is 
considered as one of the founders of neo-Realism. His contributions to the academia made him 
one of the most distinguished scholars in the field. His book “Man, State and War”5 attracted 
the attention of the academia in large scale and influenced many other studies.  In the book, 
Waltz searches for the reasons of the war and ways to prevent it. He classifies international 
relations into three “levels”, which he later called “images” instead (2001), in order to avoid 
projecting the phases as solid or concrete formations
6
. While explaining the theory, I will use 
both “image” and the more popular term “level” interchangeably; and call the “levels of 
analysis” as a “model”. 
  In his book, Waltz examines the causes of war in three main chapters: human behavior, 
international structure of states and the international anarchy. Concluding from the context of 
                                                             
5 Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) 
6 Kenneth Waltz Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 
Preface for 2001 Edition  
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the ideas, the three levels of analysis is widely called as “individual level, state level and the 
systemic level”.7  
 “According to the first image of international relations, the locus of 
the important causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of 
man…If these are the elimination of war must come through uplifting 
and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social readjustment.”8 
 
  Waltz says that human nature being the cause of the war is not a new idea. It has been 
put forward by many scholars in different ages like St. Augustine, Spinoza, Niebuhr, Hans 
Morgenthau and so on.
9
 The character of individual leaders or the very nature of the human 
beings leads to war. He did not eliminate the possibility of peace though. He divides the first 
image into optimists and pessimists; who believe that men are good and there can be peace 
versus who thinks human nature is bad. While doing his own criticism, he questions who 
determines „good‟ or „bad‟. The common example to the first level is Hitler and his 
authoritarian character that paved the way to the World War II.  
 While Waltz summarizes the first image as “the evilness of men, or their improper 
behavior lead to war; individual goodness, if it could be universalized, would mean peace.”10, 
he underlines the insufficiency of the individual level. He underlines that wars do not occur all 
the time. The factors of the first level are constants and cannot explain the variations in war and 
peace over time and space.  Besides, since “everything is related to human nature, to explain 
anything one must consider more than human nature.”11  
“For possible explanations of the occurrence or nonoccurrence of war, 
one can look to international politics (since war occurs among states), 
or one can look to the states themselves (since it is in the name of the 
state that the fighting is actually done). According to the second 
                                                             
7 James Lee Ray, “Integrating Levels of Analysis in World Politics”, Journal of Theoretical Politics 13:355 
(2001): 355-388 
8 Waltz, Man, The State, and War 
9  Waltz, Man, The State, and War, p.21  
10 Ibid, p.41 
11 Ibid, p.81 
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image, the internal organization of states is the key to understanding 
war and peace.”12 
In the second image, the focus shifts from the characteristics of individuals to the 
characteristics of states and the societies. Hobbes, Mill, Adam Smith shares similar views. One 
explanation of this level is that “war most often promotes the internal unity of each state 
involved.”13 In other words, the preservation of state can be guaranteed by uniting against a 
common enemy outside.  The domestic factors that make states act different in their external 
relations may appear in many forms. The structure or the characteristic of state leads to war. To 
specify; militarism, externalization of an internal conflict, governmental forms, political culture 
or political ideologies, economic systems and the social institutions are the determining factors 
of the causes of the conflicts. In that sense, the Marxist view stating that the capitalist states are 
prone to go war and the liberal view claiming that democratic states are less likely to go war, 
are categorized in the same level, as they place the characteristic of the state into the focus. 
Waltz states that the domestic affairs and the structure of state is one of the reasons of the war 
but he does not take it for granted. He questions the second level, and the famous “democratic 
peace theory”14 at the same time. “Is it that democracies spell peace, but we have had wars 
because there have never been enough democracies of the right kind? The import of our 
criticism of liberal theories, however, is that no prescription for international relations written 
entirely in terms of the second image can be valid, that the approach itself faulty.”15 In other 
words, he describes the domestic politics and the character of the state as the causes of the war 
whereas he puts forward that individual or state behavior cannot be the only determinant in the 
                                                             
12 Ibid, p.81 
13 Ibid, p.83 
14 For more information on democratic peace theory:  
Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1999); David E. Spiro. (1994). "Give Democratic Peace a Chance? The Insignificance of the Liberal 
Peace". International Security 19:2. (Autumn, 1994): 50-86. 
15 Waltz, Man,The State, and War, p.122 
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war-peace equation. Just like societies they live in make men, the international environment 
makes states. Thus, third level must be considered.  
 Being among the founding fathers of the neo-Realism, Waltz uses the same international 
system perception of Realism. The states are sovereign entities and none of them can use force 
over another. There is no overarching world government and this leads to the anarchy in 
international arena. In Rousseau‟s words, “the wars occur because there is nothing to prevent 
them”. 16 Machiavelli, Thucydides and Clausewitz are among the scholar who places the 
international anarchical system into the center of the problem of war. Lack of central authority 
means that states pursue their own interests, often forcefully and in conflict with the actions of 
other states. Given that the structure of the state system is anarchic, it serves in inspiring and 
tempting the political elite into carrying out military-supported power politics.
17
 The inexistence 
of a law enforcing mechanism leads states to act on their own, according to their national 
interests and their interpretations of acts of other states. In other words, a state acts after 
considering the acts of other states. This means that “the policy of a state is determined by its 
goals and by its relations to other states.”18 “Security-dilemma”19 is one of the expected 
consequences. If the state perceives that if another state is too strong, then it can turn out to be a 
threat for itself. In order to eliminate the threat, the first state thinks she needs to increase her 
security by improvements in armed forces or through buying more weapons.  
 After explaining the third image, Waltz adds that examining just international structure 
would be a mistake. Anarchy is a structural constant and consequently it cannot account for 
variations in war and peace. Besides, third level cannot explain civil wars, which occur under a 
sovereign state with the legitimacy to use force. Third image defines a framework of world 
                                                             
16 Waltz, Man,The State, and War, p.232 
17 Tuğba Ünlü, Middle East Technical University, International Security Course, PowerPoint Slides, (Fall 2008) 
18 Waltz, Man,The State, and War, p.211 
19 John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago,  
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 17 
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politics, but in the lack of first and the second images, the determinant elements of the relations 
and behaviors cannot be understood at all. He asserts that all three images and their relations 
with each other have vital role in comprehending the world politics: 
“Men make states, and states make men; but this is still a limited 
view.   One is led to a search for the more inclusive nexus of causes, 
for state are shaped by the international environment as are men by 
both the national and international environments”20 
 Despite still being one of the reliable models of IR, levels of analysis has faced with 
some criticisms. One of them is that it does not question the most important level and it focuses 
on the ultimate consequences of policy makers/states rather than the intentions behind.
21
 Another 
one is the difficulty of separating the three levels and deciding what element should be counted 
in which level.
22
 One of the criticisms of Realism is also valid in this model. According to 
Realism, states try to survive in the anarchical system and system means everything. Civil 
society is not usually considered as an actor of world politics. Thus, it is criticized as being a top-
down approach, ignoring the effects of the civil society.  
 This research is elaborated with the acknowledgement of such deficiencies. It does not 
have a claim to encompass all the aspects of the shift of Turkey‟s identity. For example, the 
paper is not going to deal with the role of the civil society; but only focus on the political side of 
the story
23
. Again in accordance with the comments of other scholars and Waltz‟s himself, it is 
                                                             
20  Waltz, Man,The State, and War, p.230 
21 John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1988) 
22 David J. Singer “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations”, World Politics, 14:1, The 
International System: Theoretical Essays. (October, 1961), p. 84 
23 For the role of civil society in Turkey‟s EU accession process see: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih 
Vakfı, Türkiye‟de Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Semozyumu – VII,  Avrupa Birliği, devlet ve STK‟lar, 
(İstanbul:Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2001) ; Senem Aydın Düzgit and Ayhan Kaya (ed.s), 
Fransa ve Türkiye Arasında Sivil Toplum Diyaloğu: Önyargıları Aşmak (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 
2009) ;  Civil Society Dialogue Between EU and Turkey (Luxembourg: Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009) ;  Erhan Doğan, “Sendikalar ve Türkiye‟nin Avrupa Birliği Seyahati” (Trade Unions and 
Turkey‟s EU Journey), Akdeniz Universtiy IIBF Jorunal  6 (2003)pp.19-43. ; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “State and Civil 
Society in Turkey: Democracy, Development and Protest,” in Amyn B. Sajoo (ed.). Civil Society in Muslim 
World: Contemporary Perspectives. I.B.Tauris Publishers: London, New York (2002) pp.247-272. ; Fuat Keyman 
and Ahmet İçduygu “Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses”, 
Citizenship Studies, 7:2 (2003) pp.219-234. ;  Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Tecmen “Identity construction programs of 
the state and the EU: Case Study Phase I” (IME) WP5 (May, 2010) ; Ayça Ergün, “Civil Society in Turkey and 
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not easy to distinguish the three images sharply. One may categorize „reason A‟ into the different 
level, or may think that reason may be examined in both levels. Such arguments are not seen as 
the deficiency of the model. It is not regarded as explaining all. This paper regarded the “levels 
of analysis” as a model to explore the identity shift of Turkey in the EU accession process.  Due 
to the time and space limit, the research will be done in the abovementioned frame. 
 Although Waltz‟s levels of analysis emerged from studying the reasons of war, the model 
influenced numerous studies and can be well implemented to further international relations 
issues. However, the picture of the shift of Turkey‟s identity in the EU accession process is tried 
to be reflected within three images. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Local Dimensions of Europeanization”, Journal of European Integration, 32:5 (September 2010) pp. 507-522. ; 
Daniella Kuzmanovic, “Project Culture and Turkish Civil Society”, Turkish Studies, 11:3 (September 2010) 
pp.429-444. ;  Gaye Eslen Özerkan and Ceren Mutlu, “Turkey's EU Journey and Turkish Civil Society” 
International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 17:1 (2008) pp. 29-46. ; Ahmet Evin,  “Turkey-
EU Civil society Dialogue: Turkey-EU Observatory Conferences”, İstanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, 2008 
http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/tr/Yayinlar/EU.html  
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CHAPTER 1 
A Historical Look to Turkey’s Identity Question 
 
Since Tanzimat (1839), Ottoman Empire had done numerous reforms in order to keep up to the 
level of Western states. However, the clear cut reforms took place with the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey, with the reforms done before the declaration of the Republic and just the 
period after. Atatürk‟s Republic was, by all means, the project of modernization and „reaching 
to the level of modern civilizations.‟ Thus, Westernization and secularization came together 
with the idea of modern Turkey.  
This chapter is going to look into Turkey‟s identity question in the historical context. 
Basis of Turkey‟s identity is going to be examined with specific emphasis on the terms 
„modernization‟, „Westernization‟, „Westernism‟, „secularization‟ and „Europeanization‟; 
which are usually used interchangeably and belived to be mixed in Turkish political scene. The 
idea behind the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and the Kemalist reforms will be 
mentioned in the identitcal context. Then, how Turkey has positioned itself as a 
modern/Western state will be covered by giving references to transformations in Turkish 
13 
 
political and social life until late 1980s. The years between 1950 and late 1980s can be 
regarded as the period that Turkish politics is tried to be „westernized‟ both at home and 
abroad. Post-1980s can well be called as the period of the emergence of identity based global 
context. Related with this context developments in Turkey in post-1980s is going to be defined 
in the light of economic liberalism and the rise of political Islam. Turkey - EU relations is 
going to be explained within the „Europeanization‟ concept. The prevailing elements in the 
period until 1980s are the consistency of the actions and the notion of modernization. What is 
distinct about the last period is the predmominance of the „different‟ identity of Turkey from 
the West. In other words, from 1990s onwards, the notions of modernization and 
Westernization are no longer used in the same meaning.  
1.1. Secularism and Westernization 
Latin-origined term „secularism‟ was used from the mid-19th century in the West to 
specify the separation of church from the state.
24
  In the usage of secularism, the idea of 
'wordliness‟ is stressed whereas in laicism emphasizes the distinction of the laity from the 
clergy.
25
 Both terms, however, refer the same issue. “Secularization or laicization meant the 
transformation of persons, offices, properties, institutions or matters of an ecclesiastical or 
spiritual character to a lay, or worldly position.”26 Different from the Christianity, there is not a 
separate concept of church and state in Islam. Rather, they are believed to be fused together 
where the state was conceived as the embodiment of religion, and religion as the essence of the 
state.
27
 This underlying idea is the reason why concept of secularism has been seen or viewed 
as inconvenient to the Muslim societies.
28
 However, it was Turkey, among all Muslim 
countries, which adopted secularism and promoted secular policies by constitution. The 
                                                             
24 “Church and State." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica, 
2011. Web. 08 Jun. 2011. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/117123/church-and-state> 
25 “Secularism." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011. 
Web. 08 Jun. 2011. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/532006/secularism> 
26 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (London: Hurst&Co, 1998) p.5 
27 Ibid. p.5 
28 Eleanor Bisbee, “Tesf of Democracy in Turkey” Middle East Journal  4:2 (April 1950): 170-182  
14 
 
secularization of Turkey differs from the Christian countries though.  The problem is not 
between the church and the state, but the revolt is to the tradition that encompasses the state 
culture.
29
  
Like secularism, Westernization (Batılılaşma) and Westernism (Batıcılık) are the terms 
that have varriant meanings in the Turkey‟s social and political context. Westernization can be 
identified as the deed “to cause the ideas and ways of doing things which are common in North 
America and most of Europe to be used and accepted by someone or something in or from 
another part of the world.”30 In Turkey, Westernization is more often correlated with Europe 
rather than North America. Besides, it is more than harmonizing the way of doing things to 
Europe, rather “Westernization [is regarded] as a concept and program to “renew” the state and 
society, in effect, became an identity-constituting orientation.”31 Westernism, on the other 
hand, is the term that is more peculiar to Turkey. Westernism in Turkey “explains the thought 
that started in Ottoman State and gained new dimensions in the Republic of Turkey and that 
considers Europe as the destination that is needed to be reached and achieved socially and 
ideologically.”32 To make it clear, Westernization can be called as the process, while 
Westernism may be regarded as the advocy of the Westernization thought. The following 
sections would be more helpful to understand the usage of secularism, Westernization, 
modernization and Europeanization terms in Turkey. 
 
 
                                                             
29 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, p.6 
30 Cambridge Dictionaries Online, Westernize  
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/westernize?q=westernization 
31 İhsan Dağı, “Transformation of Islamic political identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization”, 
Turkish Studies, 6: 1 (2005) p.22 
32 Şerif Mardin, “Türk Modernleşmesi” in Murat Belge and Mete Tunçay(eds.) Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi V.1  (İstanbul: İletişim yayınları, 1983), p.9 
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1.2. Kemalist Reforms 
The Kemalist secularization reforms of first years of the Republic is an explicit reflection of the 
Western values which stems from the principle of reaching the stage achieved by the civilized 
nations. Abolition of the Caliphate (1924),  abolishing the Ministries of Sharia and Evkaf, 
closing madrasahs and unifying the education under the Ministry of Education, abolishing the 
religious settlements (tariqas), elimination of the clause stating the religion of the state is 
Islam(1928) were the reforms that took place directly after the establishing the Republic. 
Above all, the state was first named as secular in the Constitution in 1937. The West was the 
symbol of science and technology, development and the higher civilization. In order reach the 
level of Western countries, embracing West with its all aspects was the idea; not solely the 
science, knowledge or techniques. Prohibition of the wearing of fez and making wearing hat 
compulsory (1925); prohibition of Arab script and the adoption of Latin script instead (1928) 
were the most striking ones of this kind.  “The important point is to free our legal practices, our 
codes, and our legal organizations immediately from principles dominating our life that are 
incompatible with the necessities of the age… The direction to be followed in civil law and 
family law should be nothing but that of Western civilization.”33 Although there were harsh 
oppositions to the abovementioned reforms both from the society and from the Parliament, 
Atatürk and his supporters did not take a step back. It was the time for change, transforming the 
traditional state culture and modernization.
34
 
Searching about the modernization and secularization of Turkey, one will find out that 
these terms are explained in the same pattern.
35
 While the establishment of Turkish national 
                                                             
33 Atatürk‟ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I (Ankara: Atam Yayınları 1997) p.317 
34 For more information: Metin Heper,  "Islam,  Polity and Society in Turkey:  A Middle Eastern  
Perspective,"  The Middle East Journal 35: 3  (Summer 1981), pp. 350-58.;   
Howard A.  Reed, "Atatürk's  Secularizing Legacy and the Continuing Vitality of  Islam in Republican  Turkey,"  
in Cyriac K. Pullapilly, ed., Islam in the Contemporary  World  (Notre Dame, Indiana:  Cross Roads Press, 1980) 
35 For more information:  Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekingil and Uygur Kocabaşıoğlu, (ed.) Modern Türkiye‟de Siyasi 
Düşünce : Modernleşme ve Batıcılık, (Istanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 2002); 
See also: Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London and New York:  Routledge, 1993); 
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state is the essence of the modernization; the   reforms are realized according to Turkey‟s 
Western civilization trajectory in legal, political, social and cultural means. The Western life 
style was exemplary. The Swiss civil law, the Italian penal law, and the German commercial 
law were adopted in 1926. The lunar calendar was abolished and the Gregorian calendar 
became the only valid calendar (1925). Women were given suffrage (1930).  The revolutions 
were the practical consequences of the detachment from the tradition and following up the 
drastic changes in parallel with the [Western] world states.
36
  The Eastern Civilization was seen 
as the Islamic tradition while the Western Civilization was perceived as the contemporary/ 
modern civilization. The first one regulates all the spheres of life according to the rules that are 
revealed by religion. But the latter separates the tradition/religion from the daily necessities and 
that is why the Western civilization is prior to the other.
37
 The material adoptions were not 
adequate to internalize the modernized mentality.   
 
1.3.  From 1950 to late 1980s:   Westernization of the Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics 
The peak of the revolutions can be called as the “golden age of Kemalizm”38 whereas the 
period after that can be regarded as the first democratic steps of the Turkish national state, 
integration with West in both political and military terms and the rapid economic development. 
Atatürk‟s single party is replaced with a multiparty system with the victory of the Democratic 
Party (DP) (1950). Although there existed a multiparty system in the last period of Ottoman 
State, it was different from the 1950s democratic environment. The change of government by 
the people‟s will with voting was unique example in the modern Turkish Republic. Since then, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
36 In Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk mentions the concept of breaking from tradition. For more information: 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk (Istanbul: Say Yayınları, 2009) 
37 Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye‟de Çağdaşlaşma, (Istanbul:Bilgi Yayinevi, 1973) p.465 
38 Esra Özyürek, Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey. (Durham, North 
Carolina, Duke University Press, 2006) 
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Turkey enjoys the same „structural‟ multiparty system of the West, despite from the several 
ruptures in 1960, 1971 and in 1980. 
Turkey has not only turned to West in her internal affairs. Becoming a Western power 
in the international arena was one of the main tenets that constitute the political agenda. Turkey 
succeeded to remain neutral in the World War II. Then, she declared war on Germany at the 
end of the war in order to be member of the United Nations (1945). Likewise, Turkey 
contributed to the US-led UN military forces to suppress the communist aggression. By this 
way, Turkey fulfilled the aim of becoming a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) (1952). She sided with Western powers in Cold War (1945-1991) and tried to remote 
herself from the effects of Communism. More, Turkey happened to be a beneficiary of 
European Recovery Program, known as Marshall Fund, provided by US government (1948-
51). Turkey also became member of the Council of Europe (1949). In the meanwhile, “the 
American alliance has been the cornerstone of the Turkish foreign policy for more than forty 
years”.39 Turkey benefited from the US financial aids in the improvement of agriculture and the 
modernization of the armed military forces. IMF stability program was accepted in this period 
(1959). All these developments paved the way for the integration with West.  
              The abovementioned developments in Turkey‟s foreign policy were reflected in the 
writings of Turkey‟s intellectuals of statecraft. American influence was such strong that in 1957 
President Celal Bayar said he hoped Turkey to become “Little America”40. Similarly, Kamran 
Inan, Head of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Turkish Senate, published in 1974:  
“Our membership in NATO is, first of all, an important  stride  in our 
westernization  movement. We have  obtained  a place  and  a say 
within  the Atlantic  community.  The  frontiers  of Europe  now begin 
from Eastern  Turkey.  In  the context  of our  historical  development, 
this constitutes  an  important  achievement  and  a milestone…The  
                                                             
39 Andrew Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C., (Westport CT: Preager, 1994) p.23 
40 Douglas Howard, History of Turkey, (Westport CT, USA : Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001) p.131 
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countries which have similar  political  systems, and close values  and  
views of life and common interests  generally  come together…This 
has been the case in NATO."
41
 
 
Leaving international relations aside, the discussions about secularism came to the stage in the 
domestic political environment. Although DP had the tendency to use religion factor in politics 
and tried to lessen the restriction of religion in, at least, social sphere; there has not been a 
change in the secular state principle.  “DP did enjoyed strong popular support .The wide public 
support was the result of the populism and the conservatism in cultural issues that DP has used 
successfully. However, in 1960 the civilian and democratic rule was interrupted by military to 
stop the internal conflicts and „to save the democracy‟ with not much opposition of the 
society.
42
  Although the coup d‟état is an indisputable break from democracy, the democratic 
order established in a year and elections are made. The new 1961 Constitution brought 
broadened sphere of political activities to both right and left parties. Thus, it can be called the 
more liberalized constitution than the previous one.
43
 Instituting a second chamber and a 
constitutional court and by proclaiming the autonomy of universities, broadcasting and other 
institutions were some of the improvements. 
  The tension of secularism and Islamism has always been felt in the politics of Turkey. 
After 1950, Democratic Party, leaded by Adnan Menderes, came to power and showed a more 
flexible and tolerant policy toward Islamic practices. “Prior to 1970, the religious right was just 
a faction within the mainstream center-right parties. In the 1970s, it emerged as a separate 
political movement under the leadership of Necmattin Erbakan, who founded the Milli Görüş 
                                                             
41 Kamran Inan,  "Turkey  and  NATO" Foreign Policy (1974) p.72  [Taken from: Eylem Yılmaz and Pınar Bilgin, 
“Turkey: Myths and Realties” International Journal 61:1 (Winter, 2005-2006) p.52] pp. 39-59 
42 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 351 
For more information on the role of the military in Turkish politics see: William Hale, Turkish Politics and the 
Military, (London: Routledge, 1994); Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), State, Democracy and the Military, 
Turkey in the 1980s, (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988) 
43 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 359 
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movement.”44 The era after 1970 is affiliated with the „political Islam‟ in Turkey.45 „Political 
Islam‟ or „Islamism‟ is simply approaching Islam as political ideology rather than religion or 
theology.
46
  It is regarded as “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and 
organizations that pursue political objectives.”47 First party of this kind in Turkey was National 
Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi- MNP), which was closed down by Constitutional Court. 
Then, National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP) was established and it became the 
coalition partner of People‟s Republic Party in 1974. After 1980, Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-
RP) was founded. RP came to power in 1995 and formed a coalition government with True 
Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP). As a result of the heavy pressure of the institutions of the 
secular establishment, this coalition collapsed in 1997 and Welfare Party was closed down by 
Constitutional Court. This intervention has been known as „28 February Process‟, which 
expresses the military coup against Refah Party led coalition government. After the closure of 
the Welfare Party, Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) established and banned from political life like 
previous ones. Today, Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) represents Islamist ideas inTurkish 
politics. All these parties define themselves as the followers of a National Vision (Milli Görüş). 
Islamism, nationalism and anti-Westernism are three main characteristics of National Vision 
ideology. The followers of Erbakan have repeatedly used the ideas of National Vision without 
making any essential revision, because National Vision ideology is a true way, which gives 
opportunity to them to express themselves as the true Turk and true Muslim. National Vision 
ideology categorizes Erbakan‟s followers as authentic Muslims and Turks and other parties as 
„the imitators of the West‟.48 
                                                             
44 Angel Rabasa and Stephen F. Larrabee, Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, (Santa Monica, CA, USA: Rand 
Corporation, 2008) p.52 
45 Ibid.  
46 Mohammed Ayoob,  Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World , (Ann Arbor, 
MI, USA: University of Michigan Press, 2009) p 2. 
47 Guilain Denoeux, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” Middle East Policy 9:2 (2002): 61 
48 Banu Eligur, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
p.150 
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Despite the fact that democratization is one of the most important principles of Western 
political life, secularism and preserving stability prevailed over democracy in Turkey politics as 
can be felt in all the military interventions. This thesis is not going to delve into the left-right 
conflicts of the time. But the thing is that; 1960 and 1980 coup d‟états, 1971 memorandum 
were the ruptures to democracy where the suppression and restrictions were at the stage.  
 
1.4. Post-1980s: Economic Liberalism and Political Islam in Turkey & Emergence of 
Identity Based Global Context 
 
The change started to be felt in post-1980s both in Turkey and in the world. In Turkey 
economic liberalism and the rise of political Islam were the benchmarks of the aforementioned 
change, while the identity based global context constitutes the necessary background.   
 Post-1980s were the times that significant changes in Turkish politics started to be felt 
since its establishment. On one hand, the power of the military and the suppression of in both 
political and social field continued to be felt in 1980s after the 1982 Constitution. On the other 
hand, 1980s experienced the first steps towards globalization. One important event of the 
period was adopting free market economy and making private and foreign investment available 
in Turkey. Transition to liberal economy promoted closer relations with other free market 
economy countries, namely the Western countries.  Prime Minister (1983-89) and then 
President (1989-93) Turgut Özal pursued close cooperation with US and seeked full 
membership to the European Community
49
. Another distinguishing factor of the Özal period 
was his religious and conservative character.  He was known to have connections with the 
Naksibendi religious order.
50
 The dilemma of state being secular or democratic started to be felt 
more intensively within society.  Kurdish issue became one of the major problems as the 
                                                             
49 Howard, History of Turkey, p. 172 
50 Zürcher, Modern History of Turkey, p.297;  
Eligur, Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey, p.113 
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Kurdistan Workers‟ Party (PKK) started first terror activities in 1984. The new voices emerged 
in Turkey against the rigid Kemalist nationalist stance. 
The 1995 elections were widely mentioned as the revival of political Islam in Turkey. 
As Justice and Development Party‟s (AKP) core team emerged out of the Erbakan‟s Refah 
Party, their vision worths mentioning. In 1995 election campaigns, Erbakan honored Iran for 
resisting the power of the West. He promised to take Turkey out of NATO, establish an Islamic 
NATO, an Islamic UN, an Islamic version of the EU, and to generate an Islamic currency.
51
  
The warning of the military did not take so long. In 28 February 1997, National Security 
Council stated that the secularism is the guarantee of democracy and law, and made Erbakan 
resigned. Despite the instabilities of the coalition governments of 1990s, Turkey has been a 
reliable ally of US and in NATO in her foreign policy; supporting Washington in the 1990-91 
Persian Gulf War, allowing US to use İncirlik Air Base and contributing troops to U.S.-led 
operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
52
 
 
 Putting aside domestic affairs of Turkey, identity and culture started to come up as 
pivotal actors. In 1983, famous sociologist Gellner stated that “the focus of political loyalties in 
modern societies is no longer to a monarch or land or faith but rather to a culture”.53 The 
forthcoming developments seem to prove the statement of Gellner. The world was going 
through an unprecedented era in which globalization gained pace. With the collapse of the 
USSR, the traditional security concept has been challenged. The demise of the ideologically 
divided bipolar world paved the way to the emergence of different perceptions. In this respect, 
soft issues; notably culture and identity started to be discussed primarily in US and in Europe. 
Cultural identity or identity politics has become a prominent issue in studies of world politics in 
                                                             
51 Howard, Douglas A. History of Turkey, p 177. 
52 For more information about the Turkish foreign policy after World War II: Stephan F. Larrabee and Ian O. 
Lesser, Turkey as a US Security Partner (CA, USA: RAND Corporation, 2002); See also Heinz Kramer, Changing 
Turkey: Challenges to Europe and the United States (Brookings Institution Press: 2000) 
53 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (New York: Cornell University Press,1983), p.50 
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the post-Cold War era.
54
 Emergence of large scale political movements, namely feminism, 
Black Civil Rights in the U.S., gay and lesbian liberation, and the American Indian movements 
in the second half of the twentieth century, took the world‟s attention inevitably. The claims of 
injustices that the disadvantaged groups are faced with and the demand for broadening rights 
affected the internal affairs of the states as well as the world politics. Freud, in his approach to 
civilization, mentioned that love can bind people together “so long as there are other people left 
over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness” and he called this phenomenon “the 
narcissism of minor differences” in 193055. Contrary to the popular “narcissism of minor 
differences” perception; terms such as “cultural differences of people”, “minority rights”, 
“equality in diversity”, “plurality”, “multicultural environment” and “intercultural dialogue” 
have bees accepted by the people at large both within the academy and among the societies in 
1990s onwards.  
 In such an environment, Huntington‟s “Clash of Civilizations”56 thesis attracted 
tremendous attention in the world. It immediately created its antithesis. One of them is the 
“Alliance of Civilizations”, an initiative of Turkish and Spanish governments, under the 
umbrella of United Nations
57
. European Union also set a specific agenda for culture and 
declared 2008 as “the year of intercultural dialogue”58. „Celebration of differences‟ has turned 
out to be a significant „trend‟ in the era of globalization.  
Having the abovementioned features at the background, the movements in the 
international arena and developments in internal affairs have inevitably effects upon the 
                                                             
54 For more information: Jongshuk Chay, (ed.), Culture  and International Relations  (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 
1990); Ali Mazrui, Cultural  Forces in World  Politics  (London:  James Currey,  1990); David Davis and Will 
Moore,  “Ethnicity  Matters:  Transnational  Ethnic  Alliances  and  Foreign  Policy Behavior”,  International  
Studies  Quarterly,  41 (1997): 71-84 
55 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, 1930) 
56 Samuel Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993): 22-49 
57 “Many cultures, one humnatiy” is the motto of AoC. See: http://www.unaoc.org/  
58 See: http://www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu/ 
23 
 
identity of Turkey. Turkey‟s outlook started to deviate from the „Turk, Muslim, Sunni‟ trilogy, 
which was once treated as the core of the Turkish society.
59
 
 
1.5. Turkey - EU Relations  
In order to understand the Turkey-EU relations of today and for better comprehension of the 
Turkey‟s changing stance towards “Europeanization”, one must look to the historical relations 
of the actors. As mentioned before, Westernization has turned out to be the “sine qua non” of 
the Turkish modernization and is usually used as the synonym of modernization.
60
 “In fact, 
Turkey‟s membership to EU is seen as a bet over if a country, which has a desire to synthesize 
the  Western ideas in cultural, political and economic structure with her owns‟, can transform 
herself enough in order to be counted as a Western country. In this way, Turkey made herself a 
laboratory to test the various fashionable notions and theories.”61 The Turkey – European 
Community/Union (EC/EU) relations are going to be reflected in this perspective in two 
sections: pre-Helsinki period and post-Helsinki period. 
  
 Turkey pointed out her will to be part of the Western states‟ system by becoming 
member of the Council of Europe in 1949, NATO in 1952, Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (first OECC, then OECD) in 1948 and Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1999. Turkey applied to European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1959. Ankara Agreement of 1963 established the basis of the legal 
relations between Turkey and the EU. The agreement is also the initial step of Turkey‟s 
membership to the Customs Union. EC declined the full membership application of Turkey in 
                                                             
59 Soner Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turkey, (Routledge, 2006) 
60 Ziya Öniş, “Turkey‟s Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and the 
Challenges Ahead”. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 8:3 (2006) Draft 
61 B.Park, “Turkey‟s EU Candidancy :From Luxembourg to Helsinki to Ankara” Interntional Studies Association 
41.Annual Convention, (Los Angeles, CA: 14-18 March 2000) , p. 9 
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1989, stating that EC needed to improve in itself while Turkey is required to be developed 
economically, politically and socially. In 1963-1999 period, no radical changes occurred in the 
political arena, but the economic and trade relations improved due to the Customs Union 
principle. 
December 10-11, 1999 Helsinki Summit came about to be the milestone both with 
regard to the Turkey-EU relations and the democratization period of Turkey. In Helsinki 
Summit, Turkey‟s candidacy to become EU member is officially accepted, with the same 
conditions which are applied to the other candidate states. After the candidacy status, Turkey‟s 
relations with EU acquire a decisive quality and EU‟s credibility increased in the eyes of 
Turkey. In the Helsinki Summit, it is declared that Turkey needed to fulfill the Copenhagen 
criteria (1993) - the series of conditions that all candidates need to meet. In order to start to the 
negotiation process, it is stated that Turkey should have the institutions that guarantees the 
superiority of the democracy and law, protection of the human rights and minority rights and 
possesses well-functioning market economy, ability to compete with the EU market forces and 
capacity to confirm with and implement the decisions taken by EU. By this way, the frame of 
the Turkey-EU relations was drawn. The criteria and the level that Turkey supposed to reach 
were mentioned on definite terms.
62
 After the Helsinki Summit, the Europeanization process 
gained speed with the reforms on democratization in Turkey. Thanks to the decision taken in 
the Brussels Summit in the previous year, Turkey started the negotiation process in 2005. In 
this period Turkey took significant steps on the improvement of human rights and minority 
rights, rule of law and regulation of the operation of the democratic institutions. 
 
Looking to the historical relations and the modernization approach of Turkey, it would 
not be wrong to state that Turkey projects suitable and fruitful example to the term of 
                                                             
62 Kıvanç Ulusoy, Turkey‟s Reform Effort Reconsidered 1987-2004, European University Institute Working 
Papers, RSCAS 2005:28 (2005) htpp://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Publications   
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„Europeanization”‟ According to Radaelli, “Europeanization consists of processes of a) 
construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, 
policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first 
defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.”63 
Especially in the pre-Helsinki period, what we see is that Europeanization became the outcome 
of the Turkey‟s aim to reach to the contemporary civilizations. She did not only adopt the 
formal and informal rules, procedures and policy paradigms; but also embraced the Western 
norms, styles, values and the ways of doing things.  
 However, in the era after the Helsinki Summit, especially after 2002 with the AKP 
government, there occurred countless debates about the identity of Turkey.  The argument 
whether Turkish identity is compatible with European identity is a popular discussion and it has 
always been on the agenda. Turkey had been repelling the opposite arguments and had been 
continuing to refer herself as a Western country until recently. The latest argument is that 
whether Turkey is drifting apart from the West. Numerous debates came into existence with the 
AKP‟s coming to the power and due to the changes both in the world politics and the world 
political system. The argument if Turkey is turning her face to Middle East and Muslim 
countries has become a very popular issue and it found place abundantly both in the academia 
and in the daily life of a Turkish citizen through the news. The aim of this paper is to reach to a 
conclusion about this shift of the identity of Turkey. There is no doubt at all that civil society 
affected the identity debates and there are also economical and sociological dimensions of the 
issue. But this paper will focus only on the political domain.  
 
  
                                                             
63 Claudio M. Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution or  Problem?”  European Integration Online Papers 8:16 
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Chapter 2 
First Image - Individual Level 
 
The first image is going to discuss individuals‟ effects in the change of Turkey‟s identity 
projection towards EU. By individuals; political leaders are meant, namely the policy makers. 
The role of the individuals will be examined via discourse analysis. (Discourse analysis will also 
be used in interpreting the in-depth interviews made for the state level.) Discourse analysis has 
gained influence among the individuals working in a variety of disciplines as they are coming to 
recognize the ways in which changes in language use are linked to wider social and cultural 
processes, and hence are coming to appreciate the importance of using language analysis as a 
method for studying social change.
64
 Being widely used in almost every branch of social 
sciences
65
, there is an explosion of interest in the concept of discourse and discourse analysis.
66
 
Thus, one of the most effective ways to understand political leaders‟ stance towards Turkish 
identity is thought to be discourse analysis. In this section, first the discourse analysis itself will 
be explained via the writings of prominent scholars and political discourse analysis will be 
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mentioned. Then, the discourses of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu are going to be examined. Mentioned in the first 
chapter, the change started to be felt in late 1980s, but it was the AKP government that pushed 
the EU accession process more than any other government in Turkish political life. Thus, the acts 
and discourses of AKP policy makers matter much more. For this reason, the discourses of the 
AKP leaders will be analyzed from 2000 to today.  
2.1. Discourse Analysis: Literature Review 
“Discourse theory assumes that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that their meaning is 
conferred by historically specific systems of rules.”67 Discourse analysts presume that 
discourses are both constructed and constructive. It means that, “all objects are objects of 
discourse, as their meaning depends upon a socially constructed system of rules and significant 
differences”68. On the other hand, discourses construct, constitute, reproduce, challenge and 
restructure systems of knowledge and belief.
69
 There is not one single explanation of the 
discourse. In some studies, only speeches are taken as discourse; while some embrace spoken 
dialogue and written language
70
. Likewise, various scholars imply their own approaches of 
doing discourse analysis. Although the proliferation of forms of discourse analysis makes it 
difficult to categorize, different approaches of prominent scholars will be looked through in 
order to acquire essential knowledge about discourse analysis.  
Zellig Harris is the first to use the „discourse analysis‟ term in 1952. He moved forward 
from the descriptive linguistics and highlighted the relation between language and culture. 
Since late 1960s, the role of language in structuring power relations gained popularity in the 
academia. Scholars such as Foucault, Derrida and Weaver have written about the function of 
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language in constructing, preserving and challenging power and knowledge.
71
 Foucault has 
contributed to the social theory with discourse analysis rather than mechanical linguistics. In 
his constitutive view of discourse, discourse actively constitutes and constructs society on 
various dimensions. Discourse constitutes the objects of knowledge, social subjects and forms 
of „self‟, social relationships, and conceptual frameworks.72 Pêcheux, explained Foucault‟s 
„discursive formation‟ term as the determinant factor of what can and should be 
said.
73
According to him, words change their meaning according to the positions of those who 
use them. Edwards & Potter discuss discursive psychological analysis of the role of 
psychological talk in institutions.
74
  Thompson is one of the prominent scholars who wrote 
about the relation between discourse, ideology and power relations. Thompson arrives at the 
conclusion that study of the ideology is the competition of meanings (signification) over 
sustaining the domination. In other words, “Thompson points out that language is used as a 
medium by which society perpetuates unequal power relationships among classes, sexes, races 
and nation states”.75 In addition, George Orwell‟s critical position towards discourse and the 
repression in his “1984” novel is usually counted as one of the milestones of the forthcoming 
studies. Works of Fairclough, Fowler, Hodge and Kress, Halliday and Chomsky are worth 
mentioning in this category with their influence in affiliating linguistics to social and political 
activities. 
 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is one of the approaches of discourse analysis.  
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Norman Fairclough, Teun A. van Dijk and Ruth Wodak are the most notable academics in the 
field and they have contributed to CDA literature in great extends. According to them, written 
or spoken „discourse‟ is a form of social practice.76 
“It [CDA] assumes a dialectical relationship between particular 
discursive acts and the situations, institutions and social structures in 
which they are embedded: the situational, institutional and social 
contexts shape and affect discourse, and, in turn, discourses influence 
social and political reality. In other words, discourse constitutes social 
practice and is at the same time constituted by it.”77  
 
 It is „critical‟ because it “primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and 
inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political 
context.”78 Contrary to the ones who do not count CDA as a reliable analysis due to the lack of 
a common rules to apply it, Van Dijk and Michael Billig argue that its strength lays in 
articulating different concepts in each research. 
Fairclough and Wodak summarize the main assumptions of CDA as follows: 
   “1. CDA addresses social problems 
2. Power relations are discursive 
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture 
4. Discourse does ideological work 
5. Discourse is historical 
6. The link between text and society is mediated 
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory 
8. Discourse is a form of social action.”79 
 
Fairclough well examines the deficiencies in discourse analysis. He criticizes that discourse 
analysis either focus on the mechanical analysis in which the linguistics are looked through 
solely as formalistic and cognitive paradigms; or the domination of social sciences is felt 
strongly, leaving the technical analysis behind. He comments that „critical linguistics‟ approach 
                                                             
76 Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, Critical Discourse Analysis, in T. A. van Dijk (ed.), Discourse Studies: A 
Multidisciplinary Introduction: Vol.2. Discourse as Social Interaction.( London, UK: Sage Publications, 1997) 
77 Ruth Wodak, et. al. The Discursive Construction of National Identity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999: 2009) p.8 
78 Teun A. Van Dijk, Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourses, p.353 
http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/Critical%20discourse%20analysis.pdf (Original: Fairclough and Wodak, 
Critical Discourse Analysis, 1997) 
79 Ibid,p.353 (Original: Fairclough and Wodak, Critical Discourse Analysis, 1997) 
30 
 
of 1970s, „systemic linguistics‟ approach of Halliday80 and works of Michel Pecheux lack from 
a balance between the social and linguistic elements of the synthesis. Thus he synthesizes the 
works of Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Anthony 
Giddens.
81
 He has elaborated the relationship between use of language and the social change. 
“Changes in language use are an important part of wider social and 
cultural changes. Changing discourse practices contribute to change in 
knowledge (including beliefs and common sense), social relations, and 
social identities; and one needs a conception of discourse and a 
method of analysis which attends to the interplay of these three.”82 
 
 
 To sum up, language has a vital role in social and cultural change that “attempts to 
engineer the direction of change increasingly include attempts to change language practices.” 
Discussing the identical change in Turkish politics, this dissertation has mostly benefited from 
the studies of Fairclough. Although Wilson and Schlegoff criticizes Van Dijk, Wodak or 
Fairclough as taking clear political position while doing analysis,
83
 they insist that discourse 
analysis is not that naïve methodologically and epistemologically. Despite the criticisms, they 
remain to be prominent scholars that influence the discourse analysis as a whole. 
Explaining the main assumptions of discourse, discourse analysis, political and critical 
discourse analysis, I am going to focus on the discourses of Turkish political leaders that shape 
the political agenda in Turkey. Applying discourse analysis, there is no need to explain in detail 
that in this dissertation the identity will be treated as a notion that is constructed, can be 
reconstructed, deconstructed, and can be changed. I am not going to get into the detail of the 
idea of national identities being constructed. However, what I want to summarize is that I will 
assume that national identity is shaped politically and institutionally by state, by media and 
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through everyday social practices. In this picture, discourses are the part of social practices that 
have role in formation of identities and at the same time formed by the same means.  
 
2.2. Doing Discourse Analysis 
In this section, discourses of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu are going to be analyzed. Discourses cannot be understood apart 
from the society it is constructed. Thus, for better understanding, the background of Justice and 
Development Party is presented in the first section.  
2.2.1. Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) 
With the general elections in 3
rd
 of November 2002, AKP accomplished to come to power as a 
single party. Turkish political scene had been dealing with unstable coalition governments and 
the AKP rule is welcomed by tradesmen and the economic elite. Apart from the stability, AKP 
government is regarded as a sign of the rise of the political Islam in Turkey due to its 
conservative character and Islamic roots, as the leaders of AKP were previously integrated in 
the series of parties that represented religious conservative National View movement. From the 
beginning, secularist and Kemalist elite has been skeptic about the Islamist background of AKP 
and its ties with Gülen Movement.84 Opposition parties, military, judiciary, media, civil society 
organizations and significant part of the public make serious attempts to warn the AKP 
government because of its perceived intention of making Turkey an Islamic state. Despite the 
opponents, AKP has achieved electoral victories on 2002 (first party in general election with 
34% of the votes) , in 2004 with 40% (municipal election), 2007 (first party in general election 
with 47% of the votes), 2009 with 38% (municipal election) and 2010 (referendum for the 
“civil” constitution proposed by AKP accepte with 55% of the votes). AKP was successful in 
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dismantling itself from the predecessor Islamist parties and engaging into Europeanization 
process. In fact, AKP‟s being one of the parties with an Islamic background and being the most 
active supporter of EU at the same time posed an irony. AKP has been successful in positioning 
itself as the center-right party with conservative-democrat stance, embracing universal values 
and implementing serious reforms in the road to EU membership. From the beginning of 
coming to the power, AKP took serious steps that lead to the transformation of Turkey both in 
the domestic and international arena. The party –especially in the first years of coming to 
power- put stress on democracy, human rights, civil rights and cultural rights which lead to 
legitimize the importance they give to religion socially and politically. Shaping the party vision 
around the democratic values, aim of EU membership, implementing EU reforms, defining 
„Democratic Opening‟, “AKP approached transformation as a positive vehicle by which to 
increase its electoral support, its political power and its societal (both domestic and global) 
legitimacy and acceptance.”85 AKP disengage itself from the traditional National View and 
prevented itself from being labeled as anti-modern or anti-EU. AKP presented a unique 
example in Turkish political life. As mentioned above, EU membership was seen as one of the 
necessities of the Westernization process of the Kemalist secular vision. AKP‟s combining 
Islamic values and modernization paved the way for a different type of modernization that 
Turkey has not experienced before. In Erdoğan‟s words, his government is an important 
opportunity for the “conservative idea, which emphasizes tradition, history and social culture, 
gives religion a significant place and (re)constructs itself in a democratic form.”86 In order to 
understand the discursive shift in Turkey‟s identity, Erdoğan‟s speeches will be analyzed in the 
next section. 
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2.2.2. Discourses of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
The differentiation in the identity discourses is widely is seen in Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan‟s speeches. His speeches about the Alliance of Civilizations and caricature crisis 
propose illuminating examples.  I will introduce these two important events and the statements 
of Erdoğan on the issues. Then, I will mention some other speeches of Erdoğan, which do not 
point a specific event, but are important in observing the discursive shift.  
 Alliance of Civilization (AoC) is an initiative of the Governments of Turkey and Spain 
with the aim of eliminating the polarization between different societies and cultures. It came 
into being in 2005 and then institutionalized under UN. Erdoğan, in the opening of Second 
Forum of AoC, stated:  
“We said no to those who said that the clash of civilizations is 
inevitable and proved them that the alliance of civilizations is 
attainable. […] We, as Turkey and Spain, have believed the premise 
that peace and dialogue are attainable and we based our journey on this 
very premise. We believed in our hearts that mutual understanding and 
tolerance can be attained between the Christian and Muslim 
communities, Muslim and Jewish communities, and Western and 
Eastern worlds.”87  
 
Turkey‟s being the co-chair of the AoC on its own is the indicator of embracing a civilization 
other than those from Europeans. Stating that West and East, Christian and Muslim 
communities need to communicate, Erdoğan underlines that culture and civilization are solid 
and unchangeable notions that have concrete borders. Looking from this perspective, it can be 
stated that Clash of Civilizations and AoC are the product of the same line of thought 
anthropologically.
88
 In addition to that, his speech makes it clear that he had internalized 
Turkey being “Muslim”, rather than being “Western”. In his speech in the Third AoC Forum, 
he talked on the problems on the misperception of the Islam. 
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“I always say, “There‟s no Islamic terrorism.” Islam and terrorism are 
two contrary, opposite words to each other that cannot come together 
[…] How wrong a blind enmity towards the West is, and how wrong 
anti-Semitism is, it‟s as much as wrong to connect Islam with 
terrorism….Islamophobia is also that wrong.”89 
Trying to correct the improper perceptions about Muslims, Erdoğan position himself as the 
spokesman of the Islam. “Belonging to the Islam Civilization”, he has the authority to speak in 
the name of Muslims. Spain symbolizes the Christianity and Turkey stands for the „good‟ 
example of a Muslim country. The roles are also evident in the article that Erdoğan and Spanish 
Prime Minister Zapatero co-wrote in the International Heralde Tribune.
90
 
Similar attitude is seen in the Caricature Crisis in 2005. Briefly, the crisis is about the 
twelve cartoons that are published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 30 September 
2005. In the cartoons, Islamic Prophet Muhammed is depicted like a terrorist and somehow in 
an improper way.
91
 With the publication of the cartoons, the newspaper and the Danish 
government encounter with serious protests of Muslim societies and condemnations of the 
Islamist countries‟ leaders. After six months, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
was the closest candidate to be the new leader of NATO. Erdoğan stated that he is opposed to 
Danish Prime Minister‟s candidacy due to the Caricature Crisis. In his words,  
“We have gone through a caricature crisis. I make him a request to 
invite all the ambassadors of the Islamic countries, explain the 
situation and discuss how to overcome this event. He did not respond 
positively. How will those who do not have a contribution in the peace 
process react after? We have question marks. I, by myself, am 
negative.”92 
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In his speech, it is understood that he includes Turkey in “Islamic countries”. More, when the 
expected apology did not come, he opposes Rasmussen‟s candidacy of being NATO General 
Secretary as he is the Prime Minister of Denmark, the country where the caricature crisis 
emerged. Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey of the day Bülent Arınç did not 
only condemned the crisis but also took action. He sent letters to the speakers of the EU 
member states‟ national assemblies condemning the crisis and inviting them to be more 
moderate.
93
 He stated: 
“In order to avoid such crisis [caricature crisis] and to leave 
peacefully, EU needs to embrace a new vision and a new perception 
on the relations among civilizations, different religions and 
cultures.”94 
 
Although the caricatures are published in one newspaper, the blame is attributed to the state of 
the newspaper and as Denmark is an EU member state, EU as a whole became the subject of 
the argument. This is reaching to a conclusion from a small sample and making hasty 
generalization. Again, Turkey is regarded as the spokesman of the Muslim states, whom herself 
is part of, and the craricatures effected the NATO presidency elections. Again, on one part 
there are Western states, namely EU, and on the other part there are Islamic countries, which 
Turkey is included, in this case. 
 Apart from specific cases, Erdoğan and his cabinet are generous in making statements 
about the EU affair of Turkey. During his visit to Italia, he explained his visit as:  
“I said „you and we need to admit that EU is not a Christian club, EU 
is not restricted to the geographical border, EU is not an economic 
union but EU is the sum of the political values.‟ […] Turkey can be a 
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model for EU. Turkey will change the thoughts of the 1.5 billion-
populated Islam community towards EU in a positive way.”95 
In this speech, three points worth mentioning. First, Erdoğan accepts all the Muslim states, 
even all the Muslims around the world as a whole, homogeneous and unified entity. He 
disregards the differences among Muslims, namely different sects, different practices or how 
devout they are. Second, it is explicit that he refers to Turkey as an exemplary state of the 
whole Islamic community. Third, the message is that, despite the EU membership‟s benefits to 
Turkey; Turkey would provide benefits to EU in case of membership. Emphasizing Turkey‟s 
benefits to EU, with regard to the Turkey‟s sui generis identity is also a new discourse. 
Erdoğan also said that “Turkish EU membership could help Europe integrate Muslims.”96 It is 
understood that Turkey‟s role is not one-dimensional. Turkey will change the perception of 
Muslims towards EU and at the same time will be beneficial for Europe to integrate Muslims as 
well.  
 Another significant concept in Erdoğan‟s discourses is “Christian Club”. He uses this 
term frequently in order to justify Turkey‟s membership. His manner toughens throughout the 
years. He was saying that “EU is not a Christian Club and Turkey‟s membership will be the 
proof of it.”97 In 2009, in his speech in University of Gdańsk in Poland, he emphasized that “If 
Turkey does not become a part of EU, the union will only be a Christians' Club, but nothing 
else. This is the reality,”98 In one of his speeches in 2010, in the Black Sea Technical 
University (Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi) in Turkey, he stated that “if you [EU] are not a 
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Christian Club, then you have to accept us as a member. The only way to disprove being 
Christian Club, is to accept Turkey whose population is Muslim”99 
 Apparently enough, Erdoğan shapes the claims of Turkey towards EU, not within the 
economical or political context, but in the identy bases. He uses the same language of Clash of 
Civilizations and tries to form Turkey in the frame of AoC. Using “Christian Club” term, he 
clearly points out the difference between Christian Europe and Muslim Turkey. In this context, 
the subtext emerges: Turkey should become a member because it is different from European 
states. Turkey is non-European with its identity. 
  Another significant concept in Erdoğan‟s discourses is the modernity without loosing 
distinctive values. He emphasizes the values, traditions, culture, morality as the essentials of 
Turkey. In many of his speeches, he stressed that European modernity is just one type of 
modernity whereas Turkey has its own. To illustrate; 
“The conjuncture, current situation, and real policy could not be the 
main determining factors of the foreign policy. Such an 
understanding, which is disconnected from our culture, morality, and 
conscience, cannot produce a humanitarian policy. One of the 
fundamental reasons why Turkey wins approvals in a wide geography, 
especially in the Middle East, is that Turkey defends such 
principals.”100 
 
Turkey is trying to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy and Middle East appears to be 
one of the most important regions in that sense. In the discourses of leaders, it is frequently 
mentioned that Turkey has historical and cultural ties with Middle East and cannot just wait 
and see what happens. Turkey no longer isolated itself from the Middle East and not only wants 
to participate but also to be the key figure. Thus, in order to achieve its multi-dimensional 
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policy and keep its popularity in Middle East, preserving the cultural values is the key. 
Morality and culture matter in the Middle Eastern politics.  
“It is possible to change with local dynamics, with protecting local 
values. It is possible to construct a future inspired by its history, roots 
and ancient civilization. It is perfectly possible to change without 
demolishing or distorting believes, refusing societal values. There, 
with the experiences, Turkey proved that such change is possible.”101 
“Demolishing or distorting believes and refusal of societal values” are attributed to the previous 
governments, who tried to prove that Turkey possesses Western values. Again, Erdoğan 
underlines the Turkish “exceptionalism”102 and features Turkey‟s own local values, other than 
those of Western states.  
Analyzing the usage of “us” and “them” is a common practice in discourse analysis. As 
widely encountered in discourses of leaders trying to build the national identity, it is common 
in Erdoğan‟s as well. In the opening of the new facility building of Turkish Embassy of 
Bishkek, he defined “we” as the states in Central Asia, and “they” as EU states. He said: 
“As you know, in the EU, there is an implementation called Schengen. 
If they implement this, we, as the brother states [sic] in Central Asia 
can implement such policy among ourselves.”103 
To sum up, Erdoğan highlights the unique Turkish identity, rather than commonality 
with Europe. Alliance of Civilizations is the most apparent example of this view. Turkey‟s role 
as bridge, this time, is defined between West and Islam. Caricature crisis enhanced the tension 
between Muslim and Christian societies and Erdoğan, with his team, volunteered for 
advocating Islam and being the spokesman of Muslims around the world. With Erdoğan‟s 
discourses, Turkey is projected as the model and exemplary state for the Islam states. 
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Describing EU as the Christian Club shapes EU-Turkey relations agenda around identity issues. 
Turkey‟s different identity is celebrated and it is tried to be turned into an advantage: the 
“Muslim state” Turkey must be the part of it. 
2.2.3. Discourses of Ahmet Davutoğlu 
Although Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu represent the same school of thought, there are some 
differences in their discourses. While Erdoğan put stress on the Islamic credentials, Davutoğlu 
highlights the Ottoman past of Turkey alongside with Islamic background. He is usually called 
as neo-Ottoman for his “embracing Ottoman State” stance. His “multi-dimensional foreign 
policy” and “zero problem with neighbors” came to be very influential and created various 
interpretations, one of the most popular ones being „axis of Turkey is shifted to East‟. He is a 
professor in international relations, he published several books which throw light on his foreign 
policy doctrine. A special emphasis will be given to “Strategic Depth”, the book which is the 
most famous one in among his works.  
First of all, he thinks that Turkey‟s culture is different from those of Europe or USA. He 
uses the term “counter civilization” to refer to West, let alone trying to prove the commonalities 
of West and Turkey. The meaning is so explicit that doing discourse analysis is not pretty much 
needed. 
“With its dynamic characteristics, Turkish political culture 
differentiates from the political culture of Western Europe and 
American societies to a great extent. […] The most important factor 
that differentiates political culture in Turkey from different societies is 
that, this country has been the center of a civilization that had 
established unique and long-lasting political order which embraced the 
main intersection points. The effect of loosing this front-line 
relationship between this central civilization and the counter-
civilization [sic] affected the sociopsychological infrastructure, which 
makes up the political culture. Since Tanzimat, the attempts of the 
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political elite to construct a new political structure convulsed all of the 
societies in the Ottoman geography.”104   
  
He defines the effect of the Kemalist reforms and the Westernization policies that have been 
carried out as the „radical civilizational transformation‟. According to him, “suppress of 
creating a new political culture radical breakthrough from the historical continuity and political 
identity.” Glorifying the common history is regarded as widespread practice in consolidating a 
new identity in nationalism studies. He poses not an exception to that. He glorifies the Ottoman 
past and mentions that the only way to survive on itself is embracing the history, namely 
reconciling with its roots. He criticizes the Western-oriented elite approaches for creating a gap 
between the society and state elites and for missed opportunities during the past 50 years to 
redirect Turkish foreign policy
105
 towards the geo-cultural depth. Referring to the top-down 
modernization reforms, he states that “considering the society as a mass that can change with a 
single command in any time, heading towards a one-dimensional dogmatism is nothing but 
neo-orientalist approach.”106  
He continues that EU relations must be evaluated within this civilizational interaction. 
With his words, he presents that Turkey will act within the frame shaped by identity paradigms. 
By this way, Turkey shows her cards to EU, within the principle of respecting and preserving 
diversity. In Davutoğlu‟s view, EU aims to leave Turkey in ambiguity and the issues of human 
rights, Cyprus, Aegean Sea and economic parameters are just the pretexts of this ambiguity 
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strategy.
107
 Accepting the problems in the abovementioned issues, he believes that the identical 
dimension of Turkey-EU relations is the most decisive aspect. 
The main thesis of the „Strategic Depth Doctrine‟ is that Turkey will gain the „central-
state‟ position with its geographical and historical depth. He constantly put emphasis of 
Turkey‟s distinct characteristics which is stemmed from its giant history and culture. He uses 
the term of “geopolitical depth” many times throughout the book to refer to the state‟s 
“continuity of the place” and the “mutual interaction within its strategic sphere.”108  With the 
“continuity of place”, he attributes the Ottoman geography and mentions that without the time-
place consciousness, a state cannot outshine.
109
 With his doctrine; Turkey should act as the 
pivot in Balkans, Caucasus, Black Sea, Middle East, Mediterranean, Caspian Sea and Gulf 
States.  Ottoman Empire‟s legacy is the geographical depth that Turkey needs to engage in the 
active politics in the neighborhood. He thinks that taking active role in the regions once under 
the Ottoman rule, is the moral responsibility of today‟s Turkey.  
“One of the main tenets of being a historical center for Turkey is that 
it was established on the legacy of the Ottomans, which was one of the 
eight states in the 20th century that embodied numerous geopolitical, 
geo-economic and geo-cultural elements within a single, large scale 
political unit (empire). Geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-cultural 
fragmentations that occurred during the dissolutions of such large 
units forced the countries which were formerly the central pieces of 
those political structures, to assume a serious historical responsibility 
and deal with the challenges that followed.”110 
Apart from responsibility, he claims that there is an inherent Ottoman thinking in the each 
individual of the Turkish society. In one of his interviews, he claims that “Turkish intellectuals, 
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even those who are strongly committed to the Westernization as the prevalent ideology, there is 
a hidden Ottoman living inside.”111  
 One of the main arguments of Davutoğlu is the Islamic credentials of Turkey and the 
vision of Islamic civilization. He thinks that the Muslim world, which became the intersectional 
arena of these two phenomena, civilizational revival and strategic competition, becomes the 
focal point in international relations. He grounds his civilization vision on Huntington‟s Clash 
of Civilizations thesis and puts forward that Turkey, having Islamic cultural heritage, can be the 
bridge in this chaotic environment.  
“Possessing the most important elements of old humanity knowledge, 
blessed with the most refined cultural heritage of Islamic civilization 
and constituting a serious inter-civilizational interaction area, Turkey 
should use this position to pioneer a new civilizational opening.”112 
In other words, Turkey is part of the Islamic civilization and this character of Turkey should go 
for its own peculiarities, without trying to be part of another civilization, which is West. While 
referring to Islamic civilization and Western civilization as two different civilizations like 
Huntington, he thinks that the basins that are in danger of annihilation by Western civilization 
should come closer. It is required to avoid the Western hegemony that will address only one 
dimension to the humankind and narrows the human horizon.
113
 It is acquired that Turkey, 
which has been trying to prove that she is Western from its establishment to present day, now 
distinct itself from Western civilization, regard the West with disfavor and claims that it does 
not fulfill all the complex requirements of the mankind.  
Another point that is also seen in Davutoğlu‟s speeches is to see the Islamic civilization 
as the homogeneous and unchangeable entities, ignoring the clashes between Sunnis, Shiites 
and Muslim Kurds. He emphasizes the religious aspect of the civilization and calls the region 
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which makes up Turkey‟s geographical depth as “the integral part of the Islamic 
civilization.”114 Due to his attempts on eliminating the differences and projecting Islamic 
civilization as a single integral body, Murinson claims that Davutoğlu substitutes „ummah‟, a 
term with religious connotations, by the more neutral term „Islamic civilization‟115. According 
to Davutoğlu, the issue of Karabakh and the invasion of Azeri lands by Armenian forces is the 
only real cultural/civilizational clash in this region”.116 Davutoğlu referred Quran as the tool 
that shapes societies‟ behavior patterns and elites‟ mind. 
“Think about that; today a Bosnian reads Quran, so does a Turk, a 
Malaysian and a Tanzanian”. Thereby, there occurs common 
consciousness and common knowledge sphere. […] In that sense, 
Islam civilization is the one that resisted against West for the first time 
and extensively.”117 
It means that Turkey and the Islamic countries like Bosnia, Malaysia and Tanzania are in the 
same geo-cultural sphere because Islam unifies them under the same umbrella and creates the 
common identity. Besides, despite mentioning the similarities, Islamic states are positioned 
against the Western states, preserving their own characteristics.  He does not cast doubt on the 
constructive nature of the identities and explicitly says that “we need to construct a new 
identity
118
, new philosophical ground to conform to the new modernization period that is not in 
the monopoly of the Europeans anymore.
119
 
 To sum up, Davutoğlu puts emphasis on the different identities of Turkey and Europe 
and treats the relations in a civilizational perspective. He criticizes Westernization reforms as 
they created a break from the geographical and historical depth of Turkey. He underlines the 
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Ottoman heritage that Turkey cannot escape and he undertakes the responsibility stemmed from 
the Ottoman background. Last but not least, he draws attention to the Islamic culture as the soft 
power of the modern Turkish state. 
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Chapter 3 
Second Image - State Level 
 
Second image is the level that the reasons of the shift in the identity projection are going to be 
examined in within the state. The situation inside Turkey that has effect on the identical change 
will be examined in three headings: Embracing different modernities, Euro-skepticism and the 
economic improvement. After mentioning the pillars within state, the state institutions that 
reflect shift in the Turkey‟s Western identity will be analyzed based on the interviews and the 
acts of them. The institutions that are examined are Secretariat General for EU Affairs (SGEU), 
Yunus Emre Institution and the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities. 
 In the post- Helsinki period, Turkey has undergone many reforms with regard to the 
democratization. Civil and political rights, economic and social liberties, cultural rights and 
minority rights, civil-military relations, judiciary and public administration are some areas that 
the reforms took place. The Europeanization reforms in Turkey and the prevalence of the 
“unity in diversity” mentality inside the EU are the products of the same line of thought. The 
“unity in diversity” discourse gained popularity within EU thanks to Roman Prodi, the 
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President of the European Commission between 1999 and 2004.
120
 Leaving the “minority” 
word aside, EU started to use “cultural differences” instead.121 Turkey, implementing 
democratization reforms inside and act upon the EU school of thought at the same time, 
affected from the relatively liberal political environment. The woman, ethno-cultural, religious 
movements have, definitely, effected Turkey and bring the inherent argument to light. In 
Turkish state level, Kurdish nationalism appears as one of the facts of the emergence of the 
different voices. Started in 1980s, Kurdish nationalism gained pace in 1990s and became one of 
the striking examples of piercing the homogeneity of Turkish political culture. Alawite 
movement of 1990s and the “2nd republican” debates in 1990s provide similar examples.122  
As mentioned before, there has always been a tension with the seculars and the Islamist. 
Throughout the Turkish modern history, military-secular elite had continued to be the backbone 
of the Republic. Whereas this time, more democratic Turkey ignored the order coming from the 
coup d‟états and the Islamists voices started to be heard higher.  All of them posed a threat to 
the homogenous state notion that traces back to Millet system in Ottoman
123
. The products of 
Millet system was successful in creating society of „Turk-Muslim-Sunni‟ triangle and is still 
observed in contemporary Turkey. Evolving from such political culture, the rise of the new 
voices was a new phenomenon in Turkey.  With the deviancies in the „proper Turk‟ perception, 
the idea of the existence of different identities opened the way to think about the Western 
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identity of Turkey. In the Turkish history, the debate between the seculars and the 
Islamists/conservatists has always been a thorny issue. Having these features at the background, 
the Western type of modernization is started to be questioned. The modernization used to be 
perceived as the linear process that is the product of West. When the term „modernization‟ is 
used, there was no need to mention the character of the process; it was inevitably perceived as 
the Western modernization. However, the Western monopoly, namely the European and later 
on the American hegemony, started to be rethought, in the light of the celebrating differences. 
Parallel with the developments and academic accumulation
124
 in the international arena, Turkey 
started to embrace the idea of „multiple modernities‟. Just like the sui generis character of 
Chinese, Japanese modernization, Turkey started to pose a modernization of her own, with her 
distinct characteristics. The idea of various modernities is welcomed in Turkey by the 
abovementioned groups, especially conservatists who feel themselves not conforming to the 
cultural practices of the Western lifestyles. Multiple interpretations of modernity other than of 
West pave the way for the acceleration of „Turkish exceptionalism‟.  Among other things, it is 
ironic that the democratization wave that is very much related to the Helsinki, Copenhagen and 
Amsterdam Summits lead to the rise of the different voices and the “cultural diversity” notion; 
and in the present situation, the outputs of the Europeanization reforms lead – or at least 
effected strongly- to the differentiation from Europe.  
 Another aspect that should be dealt in the state level is the Euro-skepticism of Turkey. 
Before talking about the today‟s circumstances that paved the way for casting doubt on EU, 
“Sevres Syndrome” needed to be well understood. Sevres Syndrome is the perception that 
Turkey is encircled with enemies whom try to divide up the country. This manner is named 
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after the Treaty of Sevres, signed by Allied powers and Ottoman Empire in 1920. According to 
the treaty, the Ottoman Empire was to be divided between Britain, France, Armenia and 
Greece. The Sévres Treaty has not been implemented and replaced by the Lausanne Peace 
Treaty after the 1923 Independence War. However, its effects lasted in the social psyche for so 
long and the Sevres Syndrome is kept alive to today.    
There are several reasons for the Sévres Syndrome to arouse in the EU accession period.  
One of the main issues that trigger the Euro-skepticism is the harsh oppositions of some EU 
member states, i.e. France, Germany, Austria, against Turkish membership. Former French 
President Valéry Giscard d‟Estang continuously stated that “Turkey entry would destroy 
EU”.125 His opposition is derived neither derived from the deficiencies in human rights or 
economy, nor the foreign policy deadlocks. His claims are based on identical differences and 
argue that to have a European patriotism, there needs to be a strong European identity which is, 
in his view, based on the cultural richness of Ancient Greece and Rome, and the innovative and 
creative soul of Renaissance. His key argument here is that Turkey has never shared any of 
those experiences; therefore Turkey‟s inclusion will change the structure of the European 
Project.
126
 Former Interior Minister and today‟s President of France Nicholas Sarkozy also 
thinks that Turkey is an Asian state and cannot be part of EU because Turkey is a Muslim 
country.
127
 Leaving changing his stance after becoming president, he even toughened his 
opposition to Turkey‟s membership and to the Muslim world in general. German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel also repeatedly said that Turkey is not suitable for EU
128
 and put forward the 
„privileged partnership‟ option rather than full membership. Moreover, the public opinion in 
EU to membership of Turkey has fallen steadily. Germany, France, Austria, Denmark and 
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Holland are the countries that the support for the Turkey‟s membership is in minimum degrees. 
According to the surveys of Transatlantic Trends, the project German Marshall Fund of US, the 
public opinion of EU member states has been declining from 2005
129
. According to the recent 
survey, 22% of the European public see Turkish EU as positive. When it came to shared values, 
only 32% of the European public think that Turkey had enough values in common with the 
West.
130
 In return, Turks also became less enthusiastic about the EU membership. From 2004 
to 2008, it is observed that there is a steady decline in the ratios of the Turkish people who see 
the Turkey‟s EU membership as “positive”.131 
Some other elements that triggered “Euroscepticism, nationalism and parochialism in 
Turkey” are “the disapproving sentiments towards the American occupation of Iraq, the 
limitations on national sovereignty posed by the EU integration, the high tide of the 90th 
anniversary of the Armenian “deportation”/“genocide” among the Armenian diaspora (2005), 
the “risk of recognition” of Southern Cyprus by Turkey for the sake of the EU integration and 
Israel‟s attacks on Lebanon in 2006.”132 
Not surprisingly, the anti-Turkey stance of the member states and the Turkish public 
opinion affected Turkey‟s policies towards EU. As a reaction against the ones who are not in 
favour of the Turkey‟s membership, Turkey developed a defensive attitude and declared many 
times that it would be disadvantageous for EU, not for Turkey. In one of his speeches, when 
Erdoğan is asked about Sarkozy‟s attitude, he replied that Turkey would go on her own path, if 
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EU does not want Turkey.
133
 Similarly, Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış stated that “Turkey is 
not, anymore, a country to beg in front of the EU.”134 Turkey, this time, does not try to prove 
that she is European, but declares that EU would be the loser without Turkey. Erdoğan‟s top 
adviser İbrahim Kalın also mentioned “It would not be the end of the world for Turkey if the 
EU does not accept Turkey into the Union. However, if Europe turns into a continent without 
tolerance, then it would be the eventual loser,” 135 
Economic improvement of Turkey appears as another factor in the Turkey‟s shift which 
is related with both internal dynamics and external relations. Starting from the internal 
dynamics, one can say that the increasing prosperity within Anatolia effected the Turkey 
experienced uninterrupted economic growth since 2002.  Due to the growth in economy, the 
foreign investment rates increased to a high degree. In his analysis in 2008, O. Lesser stated 
“High growth has been accompanied and supported by dramatic 
increases in foreign investment of all kinds.  The revival of Turkey‟s 
real economy, and especially the fortunes of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises in the years since 2000-2001, has played a role in the 
social transformation of the country, fueling prosperity in Anatolia, 
and changing patterns of power and influence in diverse sectors.” 
Starting with the internal dynamics, one can state that the economic flourish in Anatolia has 
effect upon the Turkish policy. The increase in the production rates, employment capacity and 
the capital accumulation in Anatolian cities led to the emergence of a new bourgeoisie class, 
popularly called „Anatolian tigers‟.136 With the rise of the Anatolian tigers, their political power 
started to be felt. TÜSIAD, once believed to be the beholder of the economic power and posses 
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the political influence on its own, no longer was the monopoly. The Anatolian businessmen are 
regarded as the „emerging new middle class‟ of Turkey and the pillar of urbanization. Taken 
the conservative character of the „emerging new middle class‟ into the consideration, their 
power to influence the politics became an advantage for AKP. By this way, “the electoral 
support of the party does not include only poor and excluded segments of society, but also, and 
more importantly, the new conservative middle classes, empowered and enriched by the 
process of Islamic resurgence.”137 
Economic stability in Turkey also led to good relations within its neighborhood. In last 
ten years, Turkey used the advantage of the growing economies of Eastern states
138
 and 
multiplied its exports to the Middle Eastern countries with ten in eight years. In 2000, Turkey‟s 
export rates were 2.573 billion dollar and increased to 25.430 billion dollars in 2008.
139
 
Although the trade rates are negatively affected from the recent economic crisis, Turkey carries 
on with the fruitful economic relations with the growing Middle East countries, in which she 
enjoys geographical proximity and historical ties. Furthermore, the economical aspect of the 
Turkish foreign policy laid pragmatic grounds for the detaching from West. The hope was that 
Turkey‟s capability to materialize its economic development at home as well as to reach out to 
her neighborhood would become much easier if Turkey defined herself as a Eurasian country 
rather than to be the one whose number one foreign policy interest is to join the EU.
140
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To sum up, three factors with many subtitles are examined to clarify the Turkey‟s 
position in identity projection. One is the embracing the different modernities in the light of the 
rise of different voices and the second is the revival of the inherent Euro-skepticism. Both 
factors are reflections of the Turkish political culture and the historical perception to today‟s 
policies. The third one is the rediscovery of the Balkans and especially Middle Eastern region 
due to the economic improvements.  Turkish case provides an example of the Waltz‟s argument 
that the political culture and economic structure affects how states act. 
 
3.1. Secretariat General for EU Affairs 
Secretariat General for EU Affairs (SGEU) is established in 2000 with the aim of providing 
internal coordination between public institutions in accordance with the programs for the 
preparation of Turkey‟s membership to EU. Turkey‟s Communication Strategy for EU (CSEU) 
is prepared by Secretariat General for EU Affairs. This section will examine “EU 
Communication Strategy 2010” and “EU Strategy for Turkey‟s Accession” reports with respect 
to the identity reflection. SGEU is the institution that is responsible for EU affairs and the EU 
membership is its ultimate aim. What is meant is that the institution‟s stance and the carried 
activities are unquestionably pro-European. Thus, the pro-European practices will not be paid 
attention. Instead, the remarkable points that clarifies Turkey‟s altered attitude will be put 
emphasis in the CSEU. 
 CSEU put forward the two-dimensioned strategy: Explaining Turkey to EU and 
explaining EU to Turkey. Being aware of the Turkish-skepticism in Europe and the Euro-
skepticism in Turkey, CSEU aims to eliminate the prejudices of both sides. The CSEU 
provides comprehensible and practical agenda that includes state institutions, embassies, think-
tanks, NGOs, civil society, academics, students, conventional and social media. One of the 
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main principles in the CSEU is to put more emphasis on the states which do not in favor of the 
Turkey‟s membership, namely France, Germany, Austria, Denmark and Holland.141 Moreover, 
as indicated in the CSEU, SGEU acts promptly to repulse the “defamatory campaigns” carried 
out in the media and internet. 
CSEU identified some “general messages” which should be delivered to EU institutions 
and the public opinions. Two of the messages aim to project Turkey‟s European identity: 
Turkey sharing the same values with Europe and the Turkey‟s location in the European system. 
Other five messages that have relevance with the identity discourse reveal the Turkey‟s 
importance regarding the civilizational context and the benefits that Turkey can provide with 
her identity. Some of them are “our role in Alliance of Civilizations, being the cradle of the 
civilizations and religions, being bridge between cultures, being a model for the cohabitate of 
different cultures, history of peace and stability that will be generated together”.142 In order to 
give the messages, CSEU is determined to utilize all the media tools with a specific emphasis 
on social networks. With instant updates, the Secretariat is quite successful in using Facebook, 
Twitter and blogs.
143
 
The strategy calls for creating a “Turkey brand” in the advertisement form including 
mottos and catchwords.
144
 CSEU also seek students support to EU and put emphasis on student 
participation in EU affairs. Combining the two aims, SGEU implemented “The Competition of 
Young Communicators on the Path to the EU” among university students. It is worth 
mentioning that the winner of the television category is called “Our life is a la Turca , its 
standard is Europe (Hayatımız Alaturka, Standardı Avrupa)”.  While the advertisement 
                                                             
141 Secretariat General for European Union, “Türkiye‟nin Avrupa Birliği İletişim Stratejisi” [Turkey‟s 
Communication Strategy of EU] (Ankara: Ocak 2010), p.1 http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/strateji/abis_tr1.pdf 
142 Ibid, p.6 
143 Egemen Bağış has a personal Twitter account. There is a Facebook account of SGEU. The news are frequently 
updated. See: http://twitter.com/#!/Egemen_Bagis ; http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100001694267128 
144 Secretariat General for European Union, “Türkiye‟nin Avrupa Birliği İletişim Stratejisi” [Turkey‟s 
Communication Strategy of EU] (Ankara: Ocak 2010), p.8 
54 
 
demonstrates the advantages of EU membership to Turkey, it indicates the contrasts between 
Turkish customs and European way of living, with the a la Turca music at the background.
145
 
Another important point in the strategy is that the circulation of Turkish art that reflects the 
different aspects of Turkish culture, to EU countries.  Furthermore, there is an emphasis of 
“Ankara Criteria” in place of “Copenhagen Criteria”. By Ankara Criteria, it is meant that the 
democratization process will continue by all means, regardless of the ruptures in the process 
that stems from the EU states. Erdoğan uses “Ankara Criteria” to mention that Turkey is 
determined to imply the reforms with or without Europe
146
, meaning that Turkey is not making 
the changes because EU wants to, but for the good of her people with her own will. 
Similar attitude is observed in the document of “EU Strategy for Turkey‟s Accession”. 
It is stated that the important thing is the outcomes (reaching the contemporary standards and 
expansion of the rights and freedoms) of the EU accession process
147
, meaning that EU 
membership is not a sine qua non. In the document, there is an apparent effort to take the 
control of the EU process. It is stated that Turkey will act in accordance with her priorities 
regardless of the blocked, not opened or suspended chapters.
148
 By this way “the issues that are 
troublesome to Turkey can be postponed while the important issues for Turkey can be given 
priority.” In several items, the same point is exerted. “The time and speed period determined by 
EU will be reversed and Turkey will keep the control. Hereby, Turkey, by herself, will 
determine the future of the accession process in line with her own preferences and 
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priorities.[sic]”149 The stress on Turkey‟s control in EU affairs shows that, SGEU, in line with 
Erdoğan and Davutoğlu, does not want passive Turkey anymore. Turkey should be active in 
front of EU, take the control and lead the process instead of one-dimensional instructions 
coming from EU.  
Once more, it should be stated that being the driving force of EU Affairs, the aim of 
SGEU‟s establishment is to make Turkey an EU member as soon as possible. Thus, they carry 
out various activities and give messages favoring EU. In doing so, the modernization aspect 
and the benefits that EU membership would bring are mentioned. Nevertheless, it is important 
to discern that even in the SGEU, the elements that reveal the different characteristics of 
Turkey are present in the both communication and accession strategies. Turkey‟s role in 
bridging Islam and West is mentioned. Turkey‟s will to pass through the reform process is 
declared but then, it is stated that Turkey would apply reforms because she wants to, not with 
the dictate of EU. Turkey‟s determination to take the control and lead the EU process on her 
own is underlined. It means that Turkey will no longer wait for EU to take decisions but be an 
active player, like in the other spheres of foreign policy, with her own stance. 
 
2.1. Yunus Emre Foundation and Institute 
Yunus Emre Foundation is established on 5 May 2007 as a state foundation. The foundation is 
named after prominent Turkish poet and Sufi who lived in 13th century. The foundation worth 
examining as it reflects the features of current identity policy. In this section, Yunus Emre 
Institute, which is associated to the Foundation, will be introduced with regard to its aim, the 
places it operates and its activities. The institute is rather recently established and there is 
hardly any academic research on it.  However, the institution publishes monthly bulletins about 
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the activities and includes the state leaders' speeches about the institute. Moreover, personally I 
have made an interview with the Chairman of the Institute Prof. Dr. Ali Fuat Bilkan. Thus, the 
website and the bulletins of the institutions alongside with the interview will be the sources of 
the analysis. Three featured points will be drawn attention: the international dimension of the 
introducing Turkish culture, the "various modernizations" aspect within the institution and the 
uniqueness of the Turkish culture with its possible contributions to the world culture. The 
purpose of the foundation is as follows: 
“The purpose of this Act is, to introduce Turkey, its cultural heritage, 
the Turkish language, culture and art, and enhance Turkey‟s 
friendship with other countries, increase cultural Exchange, in that 
regard to present domestic and foreign information and documents on 
Turkey to the benefit of the world, to serve those who wish to receive 
an education in the fields of Turkish language, culture and arts, to 
establish a Yunus Emre Research Institution in Turkey and a Yunus 
Emre Cultural Centre abroad….”150 
The institute is thought to be the counterpart of British Council of Great British, Cervantes 
Institute of  Spanish, Goethe Institute of German and alike. There have been suggestions both 
from the academy and from the political leaders regarding the need of such an institution for 
fifteen years or earlier.
151
 But the timing of the establishment is significant.  It would not be 
wrong to say that the institution is the concrete outcome of the Turkey's recent foreign policy 
and its identical stance. The Chairman of the Institute Ali Fuat Bilkan also confirmed that the 
timing of the establishment is related with the Turkey's recent foreign policy arguments and 
Turkey's significant political stance in the international arena.
152
 The founders of the board of 
trustees include President Abdullah Gül and the members of the board of trustees include 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertuğrul 
Günay. (The comity of consultants of the foundation includes one representative of Presidency 
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of Religious Affairs alongside with the members of board of trustees.) Thus, it is natural to 
reflect the state's identity policies.  In Davutoğlu's words, one of the aim of the Yunus Emre 
Institute is to "bringing our national culture together with the universal culture and increase the 
activeness of the national culture the universal culture." It is needed because "in history not 
many nation, like ours, is interacted with different cultures and different civilizations, 
sometimes became the agent of these civilizations and sometimes make up big cultural blends 
with these civilizations..."
153
  He explains the second purpose of the institute as follows:  
"Today, the foreign policy is not only carried out by diplomacy; but is 
covered with cultural, economical and commercial ties. In this 
context, the second purpose of the institution is "to universalize 
Turkish, preserve Turkish cultural properties, spread Turkish culture 
to every generation of world. This will enable us to place our 
historical and cultural accumulation to today's strategy."
154
 
The choice of the places of the Yunus Emre Cultural Centers abroad is significant. First five 
centers are opened in the "geographical basin" of Turkey. To list them in the order; first one 
opened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, second one in Albania, third in Egypt, fourth in Macedonia and 
the fifth one opened in Kazakhstan. After the first tier, Poland, Syria, Britain, Japan and 
Belgium became the countries with Yunus Emre Cultural Centers.  The next cultural center to 
be opened will be in Peru, Lima. The places are not selected randomly.  As stated, the first tier 
of the centers puts emphasis on the common cultural values and in this respect is related with 
the inherent neo-Ottoman approach. Both Davutoğlu and Bilkan stated that the opening of the 
first cultural center in Sarajevo is not a coincidence. In the interview, Bilkan answered the 
question why some places are given priorities as follows:  
"It is because Bosnia-Herzegovina is the natural extension of our 
cultural history and cultural geography. It is like a person who embeds 
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himself under the soil and takes out his hand from far away. It is the 
part of the body. It is the part of the cultural borders."
155
 
Naming the Ottoman geography as the natural cultural boundaries is kind of a new 
phenomenon that found a place in today's Turkish foreign policy. Turkey no longer defines 
itself solely as a Western country, but also reconstructs its position as a regional leader. Bilkan 
continues his words with quotes from Davutoğlu, saying "Turkey is a Caucasian country, Black 
Sea country, Central Asia country, Middle Eastern country, Balkan country, Mediterranean 
country and a European country. Thus, it is actually difficult to decide where to begin."
156
  
While the priority is given to states where Turkey is thought to have cultural, historical ties and 
responsibilities, Yunus Emre Institution does not overlook big cities that can be counted as 
world culture centers. So, second point in the selection of Yunus Emre Cultural Centers is to 
take place in the world powers and their cultural hubs; like London, Paris, Brussels, New York 
and alike.
157
 Apart from that, the institution attaches importance to the places which are not 
familiar with Turkish culture at all. The next destinations being Peru, Estonia, Belarus is the 
reflection of the idea of Turkey's will to expand its culture universally in order to make them 
meet the Turkish culture. This idea is not limited with Turkey's region or nor with the places 
with high number of Turkish people living in. Bilkan explains that, the institution does not only 
address the Turkish communities abroad, kindreds or the Islamic geography. They have already 
known Turkish culture with its cuisine, with recent Turkish soap operas, with agreements of 
visa eliminations. He adds that the institution meets the demands from various universities 
abroad to open Yunus Emre Cultural Center under their organization. Thus, the cultural centers 
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operate firstly in "our own cultural geography"
158
; then, in the big culture cities, and finally in 
the places which are not familiar with the Turkish culture.  
 Coming to the activities of the cultural centers abroad, it is found that traditional 
Turkish culture is dominant rather than the contemporary Turkish art. For instance; art of paper 
marbling (ebru), calligraphy (hat) and gilding (tezhip) exhibitions are organized. Photographs 
of Mevlana exhibition, Semazen and Mevlevi activities exhibitions took place. The 8500 years 
history of Istanbul was introduced. Such activities seem to reveal that the cultural centers put 
emphasis on Islamic-Ottoman heritage, apart from the contemporary Turkish art. However, 
there are also some activities regarding the contemporary Turkish cinema for example. "The 
activities differ from place to place, even from city to city", says Bilkan when he was asked 
about the dominant sphere of activities. "We consider the demands of different countries and 
even cities in one country. To illustrate, the activities may target Roman minority in Bucharest 
while the needs of Turkish minority are considered in Constanta." He continues that as Albania 
and Bosnia Herzegovina posses the common cultural values with us, revealing the common 
elements matter; while in Croatia activities related with modern Turkish culture is put 
emphasis. In this context, in the former Ottoman geography, in Turkic states, in the near 
neighbor; the commonalities between Turkish culture and the country in question are come into 
prominence. However, in the big metropolises and other European cities, Turkish culture is just 
promoted, rather than accentuating commonalities. 
 Apart from introducing Turkish folk, one of the main tenets of the institute is teaching 
Turkish language. Under the organization body, there established a separate body for the 
Turkish education for foreigners and has launched a Turkish Profiency Exam (TYS) as the 
counterpart of TOEFL or DELE. The purpose of YETEM (Yunus Emre Turkish Language 
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Education Center) is "to promote Turkish as a global language in foreign countries, develop 
course materials and tools and contribute to the promotional activities of Turkey in Turkish."
159
 
YETEM also puts emphasis on expansion of Turkology studies alongside with the teaching 
Turkish practically. The main areas of activity of YETEM include teaching Ottoman language 
and arts of ebru and hat. Education of Ottoman language as part of a Turkish culture is, again, 
embracing Ottoman heritage. Teaching Ottoman language has a further dimension. With the 
abolition of the Arab alphabet in 1928, there occurred a rupture learning and teaching of 
Ottoman language -as aimed-. But now, this rupture is tried to be retrieved. 
 So far, aims, places and the activities of the institution are examined. Inferred from the 
interview from the head of the institution, from the bulletins and the information on website, 
three concepts can be regarded as the mindset behind the abovementioned actions. First one 
bases on the idea that "We are not modernized because of the Europeans."  When asked about 
his comments on Huntington's statement that "Turkey which wants to go under a civilizational 
transform, is denied from the civilization that wants to be part of."
160
, Bilkan interpreted that 
EU is an entity with cultural and political aspects; but more significantly it is an economic 
entity. If Turkey cannot become a member of EU, this will not mean that Turkey cannot 
continue to be modernized. In his words: 
"I am one of those who believe that EU issue is very much 
exaggerated. EU is perceived as a milestone. It is more of a economic 
cooperation club and if Turkey meets the conditions, it would get in. If 
not, she will not take part in there. However, Turkey has been 
adopting itself to norms of the contemporary world. It is not started 
with the establishment of the Republic. It started with Mahmud the 
second or before him.[...] Why such changes are experienced? Turkey 
has gone through many changes in order to provide an environment 
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with more freedom to the people from different religions, languages, 
cultures and races."
161
  
He also mentions that some rights that are provided to foreigners with Tanzimat, does not today 
exist in many Europeans states. He explains the difficulties in front of moving to some 
European city and the suffering in some European airports in order to show the contrasts 
between the Turkey's implementations regardful to humans of all over the world. By this way, 
it becomes clear that the one of assumptions of the institution is that Turkey would not lose 
anything from its modernization pace if she would not become a member of EU. 
 Second one is the notion that Turkish culture is not limited to one region or a specific 
geography. It is the mixture of various civilizations and cultures. In the opening speech of 
Yunus Emre Institute, Erdoğan stated: 
"We are carriers of the country, of the history and of the heritage 
which has been amalgamating different cultures and different 
civilizations for thousands of years with its own culture."
162
 
Similarly, Bilkan mentions that Turkish culture is the culture that is produced from the first era 
of the history and there is continuity in the production of culture. He means all the arts, 
literature, religion and way of livings throughout the history by culture; not a specific time 
period. Limiting the culture to a specific period of time; like pre-Ottoman or post-Ottoman or 
Republic Anatolian, is an ideological categorization. He tells that the essence of our civilization 
is formed by Seljuks. But he adds that these are just the periods that made up the Turkish 
culture at the end. He includes Mamluk, Safavid, Tamerlaine and Babür as part of the Turkish 
culture too. All in all, the prevailing vision appears to be that Turkish culture does not only 
have a regional dimension. It is thought to embrace many civilizations and is viewed as global 
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matter. This attitude is parallel with the Turkish foreign policy that conduct Turkey's role as a 
global actor, as well as being the regional leader. 
 Third, there is an emphasis on the contributions of Turkish culture to the world culture 
and to the improvement of the dialogue between civilizations. Bilkan says "Turkey is a very 
significant model for Middle East" because of the cohabitation of the Islam on one hand and 
the modern life and freedom on the other. He gives examples of Turkish hospitality as one 
factor that paves the way for the break in the "us and others" distinction. He adds that clash of 
civilizations does not exist in the real world in the daily life of peoples but it is kind of a created 
project. Turkey's role in the Alliance of Civilizations project is highlighted with its historical 
structure that enables differences to live together. For example, an exhibition is going to be 
opened in Brussels about the non-Muslims in Turkey, their way of livings and religious rituals. 
This point is worth mentioning. The institution does not only seek to show how deep history 
Turks have, but also introduce the diversity via non-Muslims. By preserving and keeping 
diversity alive, the clash of civilizations can be avoided says Bilkan. Turkey is thought to be 
one of the pioneers to accomplish it. Apart from the clash of civilizations perspective, unique 
values of Turkish culture are perceived as the center of attraction to the globalized world where 
everyone lives in the same way, eat in the same restaurants, wear the same clothes.   
 To sum up, the time of the establishment of such an institute is not a coincidence. It is 
parallel to the recent Turkish foreign policy. Briefly, the aim is to introduce Turkish culture and 
abroad and teach Turkish to foreigners. The „geo-cultural basin‟ of Turkey, namely the 
Ottoman geography is given priority in the Yunus Emre Cultural Center places. The institution 
is aimed to act as one of the major sources of Turkey's soft power. The institution can be 
regarded as the proof of the changing attitude of Turkey in EU relations. However, it would be 
unfair to say that the institution acts according to the neo-Ottoman doctrine or religious tenets. 
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It does not ignore the Western side of Turkey.  But the Western characteristics of Turkey are 
seen only one part of the story.  European character is seen only one dimension of Turkey's 
deep culture. It would not be wrong to state that the institution has nothing to do with 
extracting commonalities with European culture. Rather, the commonalities with Balkan or 
Turkic states are featured. European character of Turkey is one of the strengths of the country; 
but greater features would not be attributed.  
 
3.2. The Presidency of Turks and Related Communities Abroad (Yurtdışı Türkler ve 
Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı) 
The Presidency of Turks and Related Communities Abroad is established on 6 April 2010 and 
it is affiliated to the Minister of State Faruk Çelik. It is established in order to coordinate the 
Turkish citizens living abroad and to strengthen the ties with related communities. It operates 
under three committes: Consultancy Committee of Citizens Abroad (Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar 
Danışma Kurulu), Evaluation of Foreign Students Committee (Yabancı Öğrenci Değerlendirme 
Kurulu) and Cultural and Social Relations Coordination Committee (Kültürel ve Sosyal 
İlişkiler Eşgüdüm Değerlendirme Kurulu). There are six heads of departments, three of whose 
names are the same as the abovementioned committees. The aim and the areas of activities of 
the presidency will be briefly explained under these headings. The speeches of the President 
Kemal Yurtnaç, the web site of the presidency and the in-depth interviews which I have 
conducted with Vice President Gürsel Dönmez, Head of the Cultural and Social Relations 
Department Ramazan Çokçevik, Expert in Foreign Citizens Department Metin Atmaca and 
Experts in Cultural and Social Relations Department Ahmet Turali and Selim Öztürk  will be 
the sources of the analysis. 
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 First of all, the very idea of the establishment of such an institution and its timing needs 
to be paid attention. Although the idea to set up such a state institution has background, it is 
opened in 2010, when the arguments about „shift of axis of Turkey‟ were in its peak among 
academic circles, newspaper columnists and society. Paying such an importance to set up a new 
institution in order to collaborate with the Turks and the kindreds (soydaşlar) abroad seems that 
it is simply the reflection the outcome of Davutoğlu‟s foreign policy. He usually states: 
“We do not only have responsibility to 70 million citizens, but also we 
have a historical obligation to the lands that had carried out all kinds 
of concerns. We need to fulfill this obligation in our best”163 
Similarly, it is the reflection of Erdoğan‟s speech, mentioned also above, in the opening of the 
Bishkek Embassy Kyrgyzstan: 
“As you know, in EU, there is an implementation called Schengen. If 
they implement this, we, as the brother states [sic] in Central Asia can 
implement such policy among ourselves.”164 
The abovementioned statement is not the first of its kind. A month before, when Erdoğan was 
in Kuwait and took initiatives for the visa elimination between Turkey and Kuwait, he had said 
“We are the ones who best understand us...We are sufficient to ourselves.(Biz bize yeteriz.) But 
first of all we have to take required steps as brother states
 165.” Head of the Cultural and Social 
Relations Committee Ramazan Çokçevik thinks in line with Erdoğan. He says that it is needed 
to establish a „common customs basin‟ within the Middle Eastern and Central Asian states. He 
mentions that Schengen implementation took so long after the European Coal and Steel 
Foundation. Similarly, such implementation with the brother states of Turkey may took some 
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time, but it is doable and actually it is a must.
166
 In the regulation of the institution, it is written 
that the aim of the Department of Citizens Abroad is written as follows: 
“To raise consciousness about participating to the social life without 
loosing their own culture (öz kültürlerini kaybetmeden) to the citizens 
who live abroad or who expatriated […].”167 
This is an important point to explore. For years, there were separate institutions for the Turkish 
citizens living abroad and there have not been a full-fledged body to deal with their problems. 
The problems of the Turkish immigrants have always been a discussion topic from all the 
parties: the immigrants, their state of origin and the host state. Living with their traditions and 
daily habits were seen kind of a failure of the immigrants. The need to adapt to the social life 
and live in conformity with the host state‟s habits was the dominant discourse. Now, again 
integrating the social life of the host country matters. But this time, “without loosing their own 
culture” discourse is dominant and this discourse has found place even in the legislation of the 
institution. President Yurtnaç‟s statements about the institution‟s will to enhance their feeling 
of belonging to Turkey
168
  is regarded as the confirmation of the abovementioned perspective. 
Another statement in the same article of the legislation is: 
“To carry out activities[…] in order to protect the Turkish citizens 
living abroad and those who are not citizens anymore from 
discrimination, assimilation and from xenophobia and to cooperate 
with the people and institutions who act for the same purpose”169 
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The legislation and the statements of the Yurtnaç reveal that the state body is the 
institutionalized form of the lobbying activities. He explicitly tells that the institution is going 
to carry out activities to strengthen the lobbying. Non-governmental organizations are the 
major party in this project. He says that there are some organizations dealing with lobbying 
activities but he thinks that they are not effective and powerful enough since they remain as 
some disorganized voluntary organizations. In the end, the result of the activities should 
influence the decision mechanisms of the other states; such as the Armenian bill in USA.
170
 
Çokçevik and Turali mention the same issue. “Our presidency undertakes the diaspora 
activities. NGOs that are trying to carry out Turkish diaspora activities are disconnected and 
disorganized. Our mission is to coordinate these bodies in order to use them effectively.”171  
 The purposes of the Cultural and Social Relations Coordination Committee includes 
supporting and coordinating the activities of related individuals, NGOs and professional 
chambers in order to develop economic, social and cultural ties with kindreds and relative 
communities.
172
 Actually, acquired from to the interviews, the name of the department was 
thought to be “Kindreds and Relative Communities” at first. Then, faced with criticisms about 
using the word “kindred”, the name is changed to Cultural and Social Relations Coordination 
Committee. However, the purpose and the activities remained the same; the department deals 
with “kindreds” abroad. When Çokçevik is asked more to comment on the specific activities of 
the Cultural and Social Relations Department, he refrains from telling and says that most of 
their works are confidential. 
                                                             
170Kemal Yurtnaç:'Lobiciliği Güçlendireceğiz'” Gündem,  (May 05,2011): 6 May 2011 
http://arsiv.gundem.be/go.php?go=3212303&do=details&return=summary&pg=1 
171 Ramazan Çokçevik, Personal interview by Çağlayan Çetin, Ankara: Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar 
Başkanlığı, 5 May 2011 
172 Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı Teşkilat 
ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun, Kültüre ve Sosyal İlişkiler Daire Başkanlığı, Madda 9/1(a)  
http://www.ytb.gov.tr/Files/Document/5978-Sayili-Yurtdisi-Turkler-ve-Akraba-Topluluklar-Baskanligi-Teskilat-
ve-Gorevleri-Hakkinda-Kanun.pdf 
67 
 
The institution deals with all Turks living abroad regardless of the place and the 
cognates and their rights. Specific desks operate for the areas with high density of Turkish 
population. Germany desk is one of them. Working in the Germany desk, Atmaca states that 
their first priority is to enhance the rights of Turkish citizens in Germany and make them 
beware of their rights. He points out the change in language learning. Contrary to the previous 
immigrants, today‟s Turks living in Germany know German well; but they are not capable of 
speaking Turkish.  Thus, the aim is to make them learn Turkish
173
, avoid them alienating from 
their cultural values. When asked about the institution‟s stance towards “brain drain”, Turalı 
explains that the institution does not seek to reserve the brain drain. Rather Turks living abroad 
is viewed as a positive thing in terms of strengthening the diaspora. Instead of making them 
return their hometown; collaborating with the Turks living abroad is the policy.
174
 This attitude 
again reveals a considerable shift in the relations with Turks abroad and, more importantly, the 
shift in the perceptions. Avoiding from binding them to the “home”, the institution encourages 
Turk to live abroad in order to strengthen diasporic activities. It means that Turkey does not 
anymore want to be referred as an introverted. Not only with its trade relations or foreign 
policy, but also with its citizens, Turkey now wants to be an outward looking country. In the 
meanwhile, consolidating more powerful ties within Turks and kindred remain as the essential 
point.   
Overall, the institution seeks to reveal the solidarity between Turkish people abroad, 
regardless of whether they are citizens or kindred. The tenets examined in the first part of the 
state level and the aim of the institution intersects with each other. The more the Euro-
skepticism increases, the less the Turkish public opinion is in favor of the EU membership and 
the more discouraged the government to take action towards EU issues. The very establishment 
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of the institution can be regarded as the Turkey‟s attempt to go on its own way in opposed to 
keep waiting in front of the EU‟s door. Cooperating with Turks, kindreds and related 
communities from all over the world, collaborating to enhance the image of Turkey, raising the 
power of Turks, protecting them from assimilation and xenophobia are the moves that take the 
negative perception of „foreigners‟ towards Turks for granted. It is the declaration that EU is 
not the only alternative. Turks, Turkic states and kindreds can well form a political entity that 
can act on the world scene as the counterpart of the EU, if not a rival. It would be wrong to 
refer the institution as the rebirth of the imperial claims of pan-Turkism; but it is obvious that it 
reveals/constructs shared common sense of identity, history and destiny appeal. 
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Chapter 4 
Third Image - Systemic Level 
 
Mentioned in the previous section, the analysis would not be completed in the absence of the 
systemic level. Systemic level deals with the outcomes that stemmed from the system‟s very 
nature of anarchy. In the lack of international hierarchy, states do not obey an overarching 
authority and act in the limits of the system. In the system, there are sovereign actors and a state 
acts in accordance with the acts of other states. The changes in the international system after 
the Cold War and Turkey‟s new geopolitical position affected its identity to a great extent. In 
this part, I am going to explain the shift in the identity of Turkey in the systemic context. In 
doing so, first of all the changes in the system will be reviewed. Then, how Turkey has reacted 
to the changes will be examined with special emphasis on the regions and the actors that are 
vital in Turkish foreign policy. These are Middle East, Balkans, Central Asia & Caucasus and 
EU alongside with the notable actors US and Russia. This section aims to explore how 
systemic changes lead Turkey to act a multi-dimensional foreign policy and how this foreign 
policy affected Turkey‟s identity in the EU accession period.  
70 
 
To begin with, the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War. The 
Soviet threat is eliminated and the bipolar world came to an end. Although nuclear power still 
is an important element, the logic behind the bipolar balance that is depended on the nuclear 
weapons came to end. The era that world once dominated by US and USSR is terminated. The 
new world brought its own conditions, challenges as well as opportunities. One of the most 
important consequences was the emergence of the new nation states with the collapse of USSR 
and Yugoslavia. Fifteen new states emerged from USSR: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Five states emerged from Yugoslavia at first in 1991: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Slovenia. 
Until this time, after series of conflicts and independence wars, there existed seven states from 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia:  Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro and Slovenia. The significance of these dissolutions to Turkey will be dealt in 
separate parts below; but the point is that Turkey found herself in a different geopolitical 
situation. She became neighbor with some of the newly emerged states and the developments in 
Balkan geography urged Turkey due to the proximity and the historical and cultural ties with 
the nations in the region. Turkey found herself in more problematic environment than ever. 
Bordering with the regions Caucasus, Balkans, Middle East and the Mediterranean, Turkey 
confronted with various complications and security challenges. Moreover, the impact of West 
on the new blocs became lesser than was in the bipolar world, in which it is not a must to side 
with either US or USSR. 
The importance of the NATO diminished since its containing Communism role is 
disappeared. NATO tried to adjust itself according to the new parameters of the new era. 
Similarly, Turkey‟s strategic importance as a barrier against Soviet threat is disappeared to the 
West. However, the conditions in the new era put Turkey in a different context and created new 
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spheres in which Turkey‟s strategic position is not diminished, but changed shape. Turkey re-
identified its role in the international arena in the post-Cold War world according to the new 
parameters. Her new role leaved no space for isolationist and passive stance. The changes in 
the international system forced Turkey to be more active in her relations with other states and 
reformulate her foreign policy. The new foreign policy affected her identity and its projection 
inevitably. In December 11, 1999 Ecevit summarized Turkey‟s new role just after the EU 
summit meeting that approved Turkey‟s candidacy for membership: 
“The Turks have been Europeans for 600 years. But the Turks are not 
only Europeans. They are also Asian, Caucasian and Middle Eastern 
at once. Turkey is a power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black 
Sea Basins and the Balkans. It is becoming the energy terminal where 
the gas and oil riches of the Caspian Basin and the Caucasus will be 
transported to world markets. It is not only a bridge between Europe 
and Asia but it is also a living bridge between Christianity, Judaism 
and Islam.”175 
The same rhetoric is seen in the words of Ahmet Davutoğlu today. The striking point is that 
Erdoğan and Davutoğlu are not acting only in accordance with their personal political view, but 
it is the changing international system that make leaders act in this way, be them conservative, 
republican, left-wing or right-wing.  
What I argue is that Turkey has pursued an active policy since the end of the Cold War. 
Yet, a decade from the end of the Cold War was the era that Turkey try to get accustomed to 
the new system and involved in the regional matters that has never been that active before. In 
that period, “hard politics” still mattered; i.e. continuing impacts of Iraqi-Kuwait War, Serbo-
Bosnian and Serbo-Croat Wars, Gulf War, Chechen revolts against Russia, Abkhazians revolts 
against Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, etc were still 
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making up the major foreign policy agenda. Every state tried to settle down and find a new path 
for her foreign policy in the decade after the end of the Cold War and Turkey was no exception. 
Then, when we come to 2000s, Turkey added the “soft power” dimension to her foreign 
policy activism in hard politics. In other words, Turkey, with the decline of its importance in 
the eyes of the West after the East-West confrontation, enhanced using soft power, after getting 
over the initial impacts of the changes in the system. It is a must to mention Joseph Nye when 
the issue is “soft power”. In 1990 Nye referred to “soft power” in his book “Bound to Lead: 
The Changing Nature of American Power”. Then, in 2004, he extended the term and wrote 
about the soft power as a means of success in international relations.
176
 He explains that soft 
power is “the ability to shape the preferences of others”177. “It is the capacity to attract and 
inspire. It is about arousing interest, capturing imagination and causing admiration.”178 “Soft 
power does not involve coercion via threats or inducement via payments.”179 “It is bringing in 
the co-optive power; „the ability to shape what others want‟, different from the command 
power which may be called as „the ability to change what others do‟. It can rest on the 
attractiveness of one‟s own culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of 
political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they 
seem to be too unrealistic.”180 
Although there are some criticisms to Nye‟s soft power idea, it is regarded as one of the 
prominent concepts of world politics of 21
st
 century. In the next section, I am going to explain 
how the changes in the new order affected Turkish foreign policy and how it has been giving 
shape to Turkey‟s re-identifying herself. Since the aim is to show Turkey‟s  multi-dimensional 
                                                             
176 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (US: US PublicAffairs, 2004) 
177 Ibid 
178 Hakan Altınay, “Turkey‟s Soft Power: An Unpolished Gem or an Elusive Mirage”, Insight Turkey 10:2 (2008),  
p.55 
179 Pınar Bilgin and Berivan Eliş, “Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis”, Insight 
Turkey 10:2 (2008), p.11 
180 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power” Foreign Policy, No:80 (1990), p.7 
73 
 
foreign policy; instead of the previous prevalent one-dimensioned policy shaped by Western 
powers, the regions that Turkey has been actively involved will be examined separately.  
4.1.   Regional Assessments 
The changes in the system and the consequences over the Turkey‟s identity question will be 
examined region by region and by giving emphasis on the specific actors which have prominent 
place in Turkish foreign policy. 
4.1.1. Europe 
As the Turkey-EU relations is already examined in the previously, it is not going to be 
examined in detail in this section. Nevertheless, the changes that stemmed from the system also 
affected Europe, so did Turkey. One essential consequence of the systemic changes on EU is 
about the threat conception. EU, being in the victorious part of the Cold War, is not expecting 
conventional military threats. The Soviet threat is over. Besides, it has completed its in 
economical and political unity and still continuing to seek cultural and social unity. The 
„security‟ perception is changed. Hitherto, the security for Europeans means more terrorism, 
migration and minority problems, while it is less about the conventional military power. 
Xenophobia and intolerance to different identities are the other elements that rise in European 
societies. In return, EU is making up its agenda with the aim of finding solutions to such 
threats. Multiculturalism, cultural integration, unity in diversity concepts are celebrated and put 
forward in the legal documents of EU. In such context, Turkey positions herself accordingly in 
two ways. First, Turkey, not able to act as the barrier against Soviet threat, claims that Turkey 
can have contributions in eliminating such „soft threats‟ and  can increase EU‟s soft power.  
Second, she utilizes EU‟s concepts of the „cultural integration, unity in diversity and the 
celebrating cultural differences‟ mentality for her own advantage. Then, Turkey is not anymore 
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trying to prove that Turkey is a fully Western country. She now asserts that Turkey is different 
from EU states: She is both Muslim and secular. She has her own civilizational values. With its 
unique character, Turkey should be in the union, if you Europeans do not want to be called as 
Christian Club or as the facilitator of the clash of civilizations. Turkey enjoys smooth relations 
with non-Western part of the world. Turkey will be the door of the Middle East and Caucasus 
to EU. This is the reason that Turkey must be admitted.  
4.1.2. Middle East and Arab World 
In the Cold War period, Turkey could not play an active role in Middle East affairs. One of the 
main reasons was the anti-imperialist, anti-Western stance of the Arab world. Turkey refrained 
from conflicts with Western powers and did not want to get through any conflict that may put a 
damper on her Western alliance. Similarly, given Turkey‟s membership of NATO and 
recognizing Israel etc., Arab world was skeptic about Turkey‟s Western orientation. Another 
reason that Turkey did not pursue a comprehensive policy on the region is to avoid the clashes 
with neighbors, notably USSR.
181
 Apart from these, throughout the Cold War era Turkey 
cannot normalize her relations with the region due to the conflicts such as; fall of the 
Mosaddegh by CIA coup, 1967,1973 Arab-Israel Wars, Lebanon Civil War, 1982 Israel 
invasion of Lebanon, 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. The impacts of super powers US and USSR over 
the conflicts and their rivalry made Turkey keep away from the Arab world. 
The end of the Cold War brought instabilities to all regions and affected the already 
problematic region Middle East. The Gulf War (Iraq-Kuwait war in 1991) occurred 
immediately after the Cold War. The Western powers involved in the war and again Turkey, 
under the presidency of Özal, actively supported the international coalition against Iraq. 
However, the US power on the region was still there and there were no room for Turkey to 
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develop relations apart from the West. Then, US invasion of Afghanistan (2002) and finally 
Iraq(2003) took place. After the invasions, the failure of the US in rebuilding Iraq and of acting 
as a mediator in Middle East opened new rooms of maneuver for Turkey to pursue more 
effective diplomacy. The stability of the region has always been a matter for Turkey due to its 
proximity and due to the rich oil reserves of the region. When she found a space, she did not 
remain as an outsider observer, rather pursued to take part actively in the regional politics.   
The rise of political Islam in Turkey with AKP also affects the perception of Arab 
world. The well-economic performance of Turkey, the existence of the democratic environment 
that is far better than in any Arab state and embracing Islam at the same time impress the Arab 
world. The effective multiparty system and the preserving the secular structure is one of a kind 
in the Arab world. Reconciled democracy and Islam, Turkey has started to be seen as the model 
for the region with its unique character. Thus, especially after 2003, Turkey‟s being a model for 
the Arab world is one of the top issues in Turkish and Arab politics. The perception of the Arab 
world towards Turkey also turned out to be positive after Turkish parliament‟s refusal to allow 
the US to deploy troops on Turkish soil against Iraq. The relations with the Middle East states 
gradually improved, with the exception of Israel. In addition to the overall picture drew above, 
the improvement in one-to-one relations is seen. Syria abandoned to support PKK and the 
claims over Hatay did not compose one of the foreign policy issues anymore. Borders are 
cleaned from mines. The visas are eliminated and the free movement is provided between two 
states. Many protocols are signed between Syria and Turkey and cooperation in economic and 
social spheres is broadened.
182
  
In the meanwhile, Iraq and Turkey relations progressed. Trade between two states 
increased in the reconstruction period of Iraq and Iraq became the fifth export partner of 
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Turkey. Turkey took significant steps towards Kurdish Regional Government. Mutual visits are 
paid by the leaders of Turkey, Iraq and Regional Kurdish Government. After the Agreement 
Memorandum of 2007, High Level Strategic Cooperation Agreement is signed between Turkey 
and Iraq in 2008 in the political, economic, energy, trade, water resources, security and military 
spheres.
183
 Finally, Turkish Consulate is opened in Arbil in 2010.  
Turkey gives importance also to the relations Iran. Iran has become one of the most 
significant trade partners of Turkey, whose export rates are increased ten times in eight years 
time from 2000 to 2008. Besides with the Energy Cooperation Agreement signed in 2007, two 
states agreed on building Nabucco Pipeline, which is thought to decrease Turkey‟s dependence 
on Russia in natural gas. By this way, Turkey aims to become an important energy corridor 
between the Caspian, the Middle East, and Europe. In order to accomplish it, Turkey is 
expected to develop smooth relations with Iran.
184
 Turkey‟s support for Iran‟s peaceful nuclear 
weapons, when the whole Western world is against to, is another element that created a trust of 
Turkey in Iran. Turkey‟s desire of a powerful and stable region made her pursue an active 
independent role towards Middle East. Apart from these, Turkey has become the first country 
outside the Gulf to be given the status of strategic partner of the Gulf Cooperation Council
185
, 
whose members are United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar while 
Jordan and Morocco is expected to join in the near future.
186
 
The exception to the ongoing fruitful relations is Israel, the only non-Muslim state in the 
region. Turkey has always been in favor of seeking smooth relations with Israel due to its close 
ties with US. More, Israel and Turkey cooperation became important towards the PKK 
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supporting Syria. However, Israeli relations deteriorated over time. Turkey‟s invitation to 
Hamas leader to Turkey
187
 offended Israel. Turkey criticized the Gaza attacks of Israel in 2009 
and created a heavy negative public opinion within Turkey against Israel. In the World 
Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, on January 29, 2009, Erdoğan interrupted the 
moderator, which then became very popular as “one minute” reprimand. Erdoğan accused 
Israel of the killing ordinary people and walked out of the saloon. This severe attempt made 
relations with Israel worsen while Turkey gather attention and appreciation of the Arab world. 
Erdoğan and Turkey is celebrated in Arab world after the Davos incident. Moreover, Israeli 
attack to Mavi Marmara Gaza aid fleet coming from Turkey deteriorated the relations more.  
Before the Israeli relation got worse, Turkey has been trying to act as a mediator in 
various conflicts of the region. She tried to restart negotiations between Israel and Syria. She 
involved in Israeli-Palestinian conflict in different ways, Lebanese crisis, Syria-Iraq, Hamas-Al 
Fatah, Iran-US. Turkey‟s being a third party and her involvement in the crisis as a mediator is 
actually a new strategy in Turkish foreign policy. This willingness clearly signals a shift in 
Turkey‟s long-standing policy of non-intervention in regional conflicts.188 Acting as the new 
peace-builder in the region, her new role is somehow welcomed by different regional actors. By 
this way, Turkey opened a new sphere of influence. She did not only increase its economic, 
political and military relations and strength over the region, but also added the “soft power” 
dimension. Overall, Turkey started to be referred as the model of the Arab world and emerged 
as an active player in Middle East affairs. 
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4.1.3. Balkans 
The changes in the system affected Balkan Peninsula and its relations with Turkey. After the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, the word that explains the region best was the “instability”.  Turkey 
has historical and cultural ties with the newly emerged states and in some cases, Turkey played 
an active role in the regional conflicts. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to state that in period 
immediate after the Cold War Turkey sought a predominant role to regain Balkans. Rather, in 
the first decade of post-Cold War, the priority of Turkey was the stability and security of her 
neighborhood. Thus, Turkey shaped her policies in the limits of the new order.  
For Europe, the conflicts in the Balkans were not big enough to threaten the existing 
Western security structure. European powers were satisfied with the containment of the 
conflict.
189
 For Turkey, the conflicts may cause long-term instability and Turkey wants to be 
cautious about the migrants from the Balkans, since migration in 1989 from Bulgaria created 
problems.  Therefore, Turkey pursued an active policy towards the region and involved in the 
conflicts. The impacts of the Cold War were still there and the states were either trying to gain 
their independence or trying to transform to the liberal economic system. Thus, the impact of 
US, NATO, UN and European powers was obvious. Actually, Turkish and American foreign 
policies were complying with each other and this conformity facilitated Turkey‟s activeness on 
the region. Besides, USSR was too far to have a direct impact on. Both US and Turkey wanted 
stability and the newly emerged states to adopt liberal economy. For this reason, Turkey did not 
act bilaterally, but she took part in the multilateral actions and urged international organizations 
to play more effective role. 1992 Bosnian War and 1999 Kosovo War are the incidents that 
Turkey involved in through international mechanisms such as; KFOR, EUFOR,UNMIK, 
EULEX and EUPOL. Turkey also urged Albania and Macedonia to settle the Turkish minority 
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disputes. Turkey is one of the founding fathers of South East European Cooperation Process 
(1996) whose members are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and lately Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro and Slovenia. 
Besides, in 2008 Regional Cooperation Council is initiated among the same members including 
Turkey as well. Apart from these, Turkey was one of the firsts to recognize the newly 
independent states. Her stance towards recognition increased Turkey‟s credibility among states 
in question and Turkey had given them the support that they need from the external powers.  
To sum up, Balkans matter to Turkey geo-strategically. Despite its strategic location; 
the Ottoman legacy, historical and cultural ties and Islam, Turkish minorities constitute the 
elements why Turkey needs to take part in the Balkans actively. The gap after the Cold War 
enabled Turkey to be more interested over the region. It has not been a long time that hard 
security issues have terminated. Turkey, in the 1991-2000 period, conducted her foreign policy 
accordingly. Today, the hard security issues are less likely to emerge. Then, Turkey started to 
use its soft power and stress its historical and cultural legacy; referring to Ottoman past and 
Islam as the unifying factors. 
4.1.4. Central Asia and Caucasus 
Throughout the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia and Caucasus was 
shaped in the frame of being NATO member and strategic ally of US. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Turkey needed to develop new policies towards the new parameters of the 
region. Had been act as a barrier in front of USSR and communism, Turkey then needed to 
position herself with a new strategic role. Indeed, the region has always been important for 
Turkey‟s interests because of the oil and gas and its trade potential. Turkey was one of the first 
countries to recognize the independence of ex-Soviet states. Turkey tend to believe that she can 
consolidate the Turkish unity among the former Soviet republics of Caucasus and Central Asia; 
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namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan. Turgut Özal, the president of Turkey from 1989 to1993, was eager to fill the 
gap left from USSR. In his famous saying, “from Adriatic to great wall of China” he aimed to 
create the Turkish Unity. Just like the unified Europe, he dreamed of United Turkic World.
190
 
Turkey tried to establish close relations with newly independent states and tried to become the 
official leader of the Turkic-speaking states in the region.
191
 However, there were limits to 
Turkey‟s leadership. Although the Cold War was over and the USSR hegemony was demised 
legally, Russia‟s de facto dominance has not yet come to an end. Russia and Iran also 
redesigned their policies. They were uncomfortable with the Turkish impact, which is engaged 
into Western values and the liberal economic system. Baku-Tbilisi -Ceyhan Pipeline, which is 
planned in 1992, was seen as Turkey‟s attempts to counterbalance Russian and Iranian control 
over the region economically, politically and militarily. Despite the Russian and Iranian 
controversies, the pipeline is initiated and started to operate in 2006. Likewise, Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan natural gas pipeline is initiated. The most significant project is the Nabucco Pipeline, 
which will bring gas from the Caspian region, with much of its supplies coming from 
Azerbaijan, going through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. With the 
abovementioned projects, Turkey aim to diminish the Russian proportion over Turkey‟s oil and 
gas and to be the energy hub of the region. 
Despite the energy projects, Turkeys refrained from the confrontations with Russia and 
Iran on the hard security issues and constrained its relations with cultural and economical 
spheres. So to speak, she refrained from acting as “the big brother”. Nevertheless, this new 
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position opened Turkey various spaces to assert its influence via soft power. In other words, 
Turkey acquired advantage to exercise her soft power. There are various practical examples. 
 TÜRKSOY (International Organization of Turkic Culture) is established in 1992 in 
order to expand cultural relations within Turkic states. The aim of TÜRKSOY includes 
revealing common culture, history, religion, art, literature and examining them as whole. 
Turkish Speaking Countries Summit and Turkish General Assembly (Turkish States and 
Communities Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation Assembly) serve the same aim “Big 
Student Project” is initiated and many scholarships are provided to students from the countries 
in the region. Turkish-Kyrgyz and Turkish-Kazak universities are opened in the countries in 
question. Turkish television broadcasts are expanded.  
The starting dates of the initiatives (1992-93) make it clear that Turkey tried to make 
use of the collapse of USSR to enhance its influence over the region. In doing so, Turkey tried 
to assert the “Turkish” identity of herself and of the countries‟ in the region. She established 
pipeline projects and new economic and trade relations. She focused on cultural relations and 
wanted to strengthen the ties with educational initiatives. She tried to vitalize the historical ties 
and underlined the commonalities between Turkic states and Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey did 
not seek to spread pan-Turkist ideology and does not have the desire to establish a unified 
Turkish state. “Turkey did not succumb to a pan-Turkic temptation; it did have to devise a 
special set of policies for dealing with these new neighbors and their problems. For half-dozen 
ethnic republics and equal number of Turkic minorities in these areas, Turkey had become to 
some extent a model and leader.”192 Secular, democratic and industrialized Turkey has been 
seen as the actor that can fulfill the created „geopolitical vacuum‟193 with her very close 
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civilizational ties with the societies of the newly formed states. Turkish foreign policy over the 
region can be best described with the term “cultural Turkism”.194 Refraining from disturbing 
the Russia, Iran and other interest groups of West, Turkey pursue to utilize her soft power and 
underline the commonalities via stressing her „Turkishness‟.  
 
4.1.5. Russian Federation 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the security concerns of the bipolar system were 
abolished. Turkey, being NATO member and the Western ally, started to build relations with 
Russia. Indeed, Turkey was the first NATO member state to initiate military and political 
relations with Russia.
195
 For Turkey, Soviet and communism threat was over and a new arena 
happened to be opened for rebuilding the political and economic relations. Russia, on the other 
hand, did not see Turkey as a threat as at the beginning of the post-Cold War. The Caucasus 
and Central Asia became the new rivalry arena between Turkey and Russia, both trying to act 
the leader role. Russia intended to remain as the hegemon over the region while Turkey sought 
to vitalize the historical legacies and civilizational ties. Nevertheless, this rivalry has not led to 
a serious conflict. Turkey, well-understood Russian interests, refrained from putting herself 
forward. Turkey does not anymore support Chechens or Tatars against Russia, nor elaborates a 
harsh Pan-Turkic discourse. Instead, Turkey puts emphasis on cultural ties and educational 
cooperation within the soft power context.  Purging from the mutual threats compose one 
reason for the new era of relations. Another point is the economic importance of Russia to 
Turkey. Despite the projects to lessen the import of natural gas and oil from Russia, she still 
ranks first among Turkey‟s import partners.Turkey imports approximately 65 percent of its 
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natural gas and 25 percent of its oil from Russia
196
. Planned in 1997 and operating since 2005, 
Blue Stream is one of the most important projects for supplying natural gas from Russia  into 
 Turkey over Black Sea. The bilateral trade relations are even expected to increase to $100 
billion over the next five years.
197
 Apart from the economical dependency, Turkey and Russia 
have historically seen as the outsiders of the Western world. Despite being member of various 
Western institutions, the prolongation of the EU membership of Turkey paved the way to the 
non-Western character of Turkey to come to the scene. Turkish exclusion from EU is 
considered on the identical differences. On the other hand, Russia has been against West 
throughout the history. Russia and Turkey appear to meet on the common ground of being 
“rest”, considering the popular saying “West and the rest”.  
Having these factors at the background, it can be truly stated that Turkish-Russian 
relations became more fruitful in 2000s after consolidating mutual trust in 1990s. In 1990s, 
economic cooperation was the determinant factor while in 2000s political relations are 
expanded.  In 1992 Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is established with Turkey‟s 
initiative. The members include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey. Although BSEC has not been an organization 
like EU with tight economical or political ties, BSEC exists as the example of Turkey‟s 
attempts to consolidate new spheres for economic, political and security concerns apart from 
Europe. BlackSeaFor and Operation Black Sea Harmony also provides some examples of 
cooperation between Turkey and Russia and their will to take action against the common 
threats; terrorism, drug, weapon and human trafficking.
198
 Recently, High Level Strategic 
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Cooperation Council is set up between the two states. According to the agreements signed in 12 
May 2010, various steps are taken in political, economical, trade, social and cultural spheres. 
One important decision taken is the elimination of visas mutually for visits not exceeding thirty 
days. The new implementation not only facilitates trade relations but it is also regarded as the 
confirmation of trust between two countries.  
All in all, the disintegration of the Soviet Union opened new paths for cooperation 
between Russia and Turkey. While the concerns were dependent on economic and security 
factors in 1990s, the cooperation is expanded to political and social spheres. The improved 
relations enabled Turkey to pursue a multidimensional policy, instead of one dimensional pro-
Western agenda.   
4.1.6. United States 
Turkey‟s strategic importance is thought to decline in the eye of the Western world, particularly 
of United States, after her role being barrier against the Soviet threat is disappeared. Another 
side of the coin is the decreasing importance of US to Turkey. No more anxious about the 
spread of communism, Turkey did not feel compelled to go in line with US policies. US role in 
Turkish foreign policy changed shape. However, the new circumstances raised Turkey as a 
more important rising power. The US-Turkey relations is started to be named as “strategic 
alliance” after the Cold War. Determined under the new conditions, new threats and new 
geopolitical conditions; the new era in US-Turkey relations paved the way for a multi-
dimensional foreign policy of Turkey. Morton Abramowitz pictures Turkey in the eyes of US 
as follows:  
"Turkey poses no security threat to the United States compared to the 
situation in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Russia in and around the 
Caucasus. Turkey is not a key player like the European Union, Japan 
and China in dealing with the international financial debacle. It's not 
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an energy exporter like Saudi Arabia. It does not harbor terrorists who 
want to strike the United States, and it is not a proliferation risk like 
Pakistan and North Korea. In short, Turkey does not make headlines 
in The New York Times or on CNN.”199 
 
Abramowitz shows clearly Turkey does not pose a threat to US with regard to the primary 
foreign policy purposes.  Rather, the interests of two states meet on the common grounds. The 
importance of Turkey increases as she starts to pursue an active foreign policy in her 
geopolitical region, where consists of the main challenging geographies Middle East, Balkans, 
Caucasus and Black Sea. US aspiration to get involved in the energy politics of Caucasus and 
Central Asia, render Turkey as a strategically important ally. Turkey emerges as a reliable ally 
to balance Russia and Iran dominance over the region. US appears to adhere moderate Islam in 
opposed to radical Islamic waves dominating the region. Turkey with her secular character and 
her engagement in liberal economy and Western institutions make Turkey a unique and vital 
actor in the region to act as a model. To this end, US proposes a “Turkish model” for the 
Central Asia and Caucasus
200
. The similar situation is valid in the Middle East region. After the 
September 11 terrorist acts, terrorism found an essential place in the US National Security 
Strategy, which is once determined within conventional military threats.
201
 US re-identified the 
conception of security that emphasizes the threats stemming from the internal conditions of 
other states; particularly the lack of democracy. 9/11 attacks constituted the basis of hitherto 
US-Turkey relations inevitably. US proposed “moderate Islam” for Turkey to act as a model 
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for the Arab world
202
.  She is regarded as a bridge between Islamic world and the West. 
Although Turkey officially has not acceptted such role, it seems that she embraced being role 
model to Arab world and being a moderate-Muslim state. As a matter of course, US proposal of 
such models for the Middle East and Central Asia and Caucasus shaped Turkey‟s relations with 
her neighbors.  
In contrast to some overlapping interests, Turkish parliament rejection to US to deploy 
troops in Turkish soil to invade Iraq is seen as the sign of Turkey‟s independent foreign policy. 
The opposition to her confident super power ally is regarded as the cornerstone in Turkey‟s 
relations with US. Turkey is considered that she gave signals to the shape of the further 
Turkish-US relations, that Turkey is not dependent on US and can right pursue her own 
interests. 
Although it is a must to elaborate the Turkish-US relations in detail for better 
understanding, several points can be briefly deducted with regard to the changing position of 
Turkey. One is that, overlapping interests of Turkey and US - that is sustaining stability, 
economic improvement and to balance the emergence of a hegemon in the neighboring 
geography of Turkey – opened a wider space of manoeuver for Turkey. Second, US placed 
Turkey as the model for the Arab world and ex-Soviet countries. US regulated her policies 
accordingly and referred Turkey as a model of moderate Islam against radical Islamic, non-
democratic states of Middle East; namely Iran. And, Turkey embraced her new position. Third,  
the elimination of Soviet threat enabled Turkey to pursue an active independent policy to some 
extent (as seen in 2003 Iraq War example); rather than her previous “faithful ally” position.  
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4.2. Soft Power of Turkey 
All in all, the systemic changes opened new paths for Turkey. Turkey found herself in a new 
geopolitical environment in which one-dimensional Western-oriented policy does not meet the 
new order‟s requirements. Indeed, following multi-dimensional foreign policy has become a 
must. The system leaded Turkey to re-identify herself. In this process, Turkey was willing to 
play more active role in the neighboring regions with historical, cultural and ethnic ties. In the 
era that the key for success in world politics is thought to use soft power,
203
 Turkey embraced 
different identities to assert her influence via her unique soft power.  
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Smart Power 
published a report co-chaired by Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage in 2007. In the report, 
“smart power” term is used as the combination of hard power and soft power. The report puts 
forward the means to use US smart power. According to the report: 
“Specifically, the United States should focus on five critical areas:  
1)Alliances, partnerships and institutions: The United States must 
reinvigorate the alliances, partnerships, and institutions that serve our 
interests and help us to meet twenty-first century challenges.  
2)Global development: Elevating the role of development in U.S. 
foreign policy can help the United States align its own interests with 
the aspirations of people around the world.  
3)Public diplomacy: Bringing foreign populations to our side depends 
on building long-term, people-to-people relationships, particularly 
among youth. 
4)Economic integration: Continued engagement with the global 
economy is necessary for growth and prosperity, but the benefits of 
free trade must be expanded to include those left behind at home and 
abroad.  
5)Technology and innovation:  Energy security and climate change 
require American leadership to help establish global consensus and 
develop innovative solutions.”204 
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204 “CSIS Commıssıon on Smart Power A Smarter, More Secure America” (Co-chaired by Richard L. Armitage 
and  
Joseph s. Nye), Center for Strategic and International Studies, (Washington DC: CSIS Press, 2007), p.9 
http://media.csis.org/smartpower/071105_CSIS_Smart_Power_Report.pdf 
88 
 
The abovementioned tenets of smart power are formulated for US, but it can also be applied to 
Turkey‟s smart power as well. Although the examination of such a detailed topic requires a 
better research, the question of “what Turkey does for using her smart power?” can be briefly 
answered. The first factor “alliances, partnerships and institutions” appears as one of the areas 
that Turkey well utilizes. In recent years, Turkey has been acting as the third party and as a 
self-proposed mediator in conflict resolutions. Moreover, she is engaged in multilateral 
relations and taking multilateral actions. Being member of UN, NATO, BSEC, Council of 
Europe, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, D-8, World Trade 
Organization, Economic Cooperation Organization, Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
OECD, and TÜRKSOY etc.; Turkey builds alliances, multilateral relations and partnerships 
and participates to finding solutions to twenty-first century challenges. Among all, Turkey‟s 
co-presidency of Alliance of Civilizations is significant as Turkey ascribes a role to solve the 
problems stemming from civilizational differences to herself.  
Second point is global development. Although US and Turkey are not comparable in 
this context, Turkish contribution to global development should not be undervalued. Turkey‟s 
contributions to the development of all parts of the world through donations have increased 
over time to a great extent. Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency states that the total 
donations abroad, carried out by the just the institution itself is raised from 66 million dollars in 
2003 
205
 to 793,11 million dollars in 2008 
206
. The number is decreased to 707,17 million 
dollars in 2009 due to the economic crisis, but the rise  of the donations for the sake of global 
development is  clear as the general tendency.
207
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Third point public diplomacy is one of the issues that Turkey started to put more 
emphasis on. Building people-to-people relations and gaining the peoples putting aside the state 
leaders can be regarded as the concepts that Turkey is quite successful with. Yunus Emre 
Institution and the Presidency of Turks and Related Communities Abroad are established to 
serve this aim. Increasing the number of the foreign students coming to Turkey and increasing 
their grants constitute one of the major areas of operation for especially the latter organization. 
Mentioned before, Alliance of Civilization is a project that puts people at the center. In other 
words, the policies including people as the target are implemented. Moreover, Erdoğan‟s “One 
minute” incident in Davos and other casual speeches make Turkish Prime Minister “the leader 
of the Muslim societies”. The speeches and the character of Erdoğan is widely discussed in 
Arab media as well as in European news channels.  
Fourth point economic integration is about engagement with liberal market economy 
and trade relations. Turkey is member of European Customs Union. Trade relations are not 
only increased to a great extend, but also has expanded to the various parts of the world, 
including Africa. Both export and import rates increased.
208
 In addition, Turkey has numerous 
free trade agreements with many countries.  
The fifth point technology and innovation is one of the Turkey‟s weaker domains. 
However, Turkey signed the Kyoto Protocol and showed that she acknowledges the vitality of 
the climate change. 
As a conclusion, one can say that Turkey started to be aware of her smart power and has 
been using it in various domains. However, it does not mean that Turkey has already fulfilled 
using her smart power. There many more stuff to do. It is just a brief section that pictures 
Turkey‟s new role. As mentioned above, Turkey was born into the era that paves the way for 
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exercising her soft power through various regions, not solely to the West. The shift in the 
identity projection came as the natural outcome of this situation. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis tried to point out the changing stance of Turkey in the EU accession period within 
the identical basis. Despite its practical benefits, EU membership had been regarded as 
Turkey‟s modernization project. Being in the same block with European states had been 
thought to make Turkey as Western as others, as civilized as Europeans. Modernization, 
Westernization, secularization and later on Europeanization had been used interchangeably in 
the Turkish political context. Even before the establishment of EU, Turkey revolutionary steps 
in order to conform to the Western lifestyle. The reforms were adopted by Atatürk and then 
carried out by the forthcoming governments, institutionalized, solidified and internalized. 
Turkey‟s EU membership would mean the realization of full-fledged modernization. Adopting 
EU reforms were the extension of the Kemalist reforms and were seen as the guide keep up 
with the contemporary civilizations. In this context, Turkey had been struggling to prove that 
she is a Western state. In order to convince the European states, Turkey used to represent 
herself as Western as others. The discourses of the leaders, the practices, the implementation 
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and the foreign policy agenda was set in the way to put emphasis on the Western identity of 
Turkey. By underlining the commonalities with European states, Turkey thought she could be 
regarded as modern, Western and European.  
However, starting from 1999, this stance of Turkey towards EU started to change. 
Turkey no longer seeks for the commonalities with West; rather she puts forward the 
differences. Turkey differentiates the Western civilization from the civilization that she belongs 
to. Turkey makes clear distinction between herself and Europe. She reveals the divergent points 
between herself and EU member states and claims that this divergence should be the reason for 
Turkey‟s EU membership.  
 Whether Turkey is drifted apart from Europe is not in the scope of this study. The 
change in the Turkey‟s identity towards EU is analyzed. The changes are examined in three 
chapters. Kenneth Walt‟s “levels of analysis” model is used in order to provide a 
comprehensive understanding and to facilitate studying. The majority of the studies about 
Turkey‟s relations with Western world and her identity question are stucked into single 
dimensional explanations. They usually refer to the conservative character of the AKP. Those 
who are thought to be in the „secular‟ group in the secular versus Islamist dilemma tend to 
think that AKP is unwilling to be part of the Western world and has a desire to make Turkey an 
Islamic or Middle Eastern state. However, despite its conservative character, AKP is the party 
that has taken much more steps for EU membership than any other rulling party in Turkish 
political scene. On the other hand, nationalists are inclined to put the „blame‟ on the strong 
opposition of the some EU states. But very few tend to question the inherent reasons. Although 
these factors matter, they should be examined in a broader context to avoid misleading.  
This paper aimed to overcome the superficial approaches. Levels of analysis is chosen 
as a model because it provides a deeper understanding with individual, state and systemic 
93 
 
images. Admitting that no model is perfect, it is not claimed to explain everything; rather it is 
used as a guide in the analysis. 
In individual level, the character of the AKP leaders is examined. The 
Islamist/conservative background of the AKP cabinet is put forward and their personal 
perceptions are put forward as one of the reasons of the change. In doing so, the speeches of 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu are 
analyzed through discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis enabled us reveal what is 
inherently mentioned in the speeches. What is observed is that both Erdoğan and Davutoğlu 
describe Turkey in a different track than of Western countries. They both reveal the unique 
characters of Turkey and present the West as a different civilization. They like to use words 
like civilization, values and social norms. While they share common basic principles in 
projecting Turkey, there are minor differences in their Turkish image. Erdoğan is more likely to 
underline the Islamic credentials of Turkey while Davutoğlu adds Ottoman dimension. Both of 
them think that relations with the states that Turkey has historical, geographical, cultural and 
religious ties should be strengthened. In that context, historical ties refer to the Ottoman 
history; geographical ties refer to Ottoman geography; cultural and religious ties refer to the 
„Muslim states‟.  They underline the multi-dimensional identity of Turkey and avoid from 
emphasizing solely the Western character. More, the advantages that Turkey would bring to EU 
are mentioned strongly. Turkey would be the factor that would be decisive in the future of the 
EU. Turkey would make EU define itself within the concepts of plurality and democracy. 
Otherwise, EU would remain as an identity based institution and cannot escape from labeled as 
the Christian Club.  
Although the personal views of the leaders have strong impact on the foreign policy, it 
can not constitute the whole answer. In the second chapter, the state image is examined. The 
inner dynamics of the state is analyzed. Three factors can be stated with regard to the dynamics 
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of the state. First one is the emergence of the idea of various modernities. The effects of global 
women movement, ethno-cultural and religious movements; reached Turkey. The „unity in 
diversity‟ and „celebrating cultural differences‟ discourses within the EU are also resonated in 
Turkey. Such developments revealed the inherent identities in Turkey. Kurdish and Alawite 
identities uncovered and started to be heard louder. The already existing secular-Islamist 
dilemma came to stage and found a wider place in the political agenda. In this context, Western 
type of modernization started to be questioned. The idea of being modern and Muslim at the 
same time gathered attention within the Turkish society. Another point is the enhancing Euro-
skepticism within Turkey. Turkish state has traditionally viewed the external powers as threats 
to Turkish unity. Going back to the Sevres Agreement, there has been an inherent skepticism 
towards Western powers. The identity-based harsh oppositions of EU states to Turkey‟s 
membership boosted the Euro-skepticism. The last factor is about the economic situation about 
Turkey. The improvement of Turkish economy led to perform fruitful trade relations with 
Middle Eastern states and decreased its dependency to Western institutions; namely IMF. 
More, the emergence of a new bourgeoisie class in Anatolia, appeared to have influence over 
political domain. Considering the conservative character of the Anatolian tigers, Turkey started 
to rediscover the economic importance of the non-Western regions.  
In order to reflect the state-origined changes, three public institutions are examined: 
Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Yunus Emre Institution and Presidency of Turks and 
Related Communities Abroad. Being the principal agent for EU membership process, SGEU 
does not have a divergent position from EU.  However, the similar rhetoric as of Erdoğan and 
Davutoğlu perception is also observed. The advantages that Turkey is supposed to bring are 
underlined. Turkey‟s determination to carry out the reforms with or without EU, are mentioned. 
Turkey tries to take the control of the process, instead of passively implementing the required 
reforms. Secondly, Yunus Emre Insititute emerges as one of the main tools of Turkish soft 
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power. The institution aims to teach Turkish language and culture in various parts of the world 
with a distinctive importance to the Ottoman geography. The first cultural centers are opened in 
the Balkans, where ongoing activities aim to underline the commonalities with Turkish and 
Balkan cultures. Turkish culture lies at the heart of the institution while Europeanness is 
regarded as one of the many dimensions of Turkey. Last institution TRCA draws attentions 
with its very aim. Formation of organized lobbying activities and diaspora activities by state 
hand are the main aim of the institution. TRCA not only deals with Turks abroad, but also 
encompasses Turkic communities. The very establishment of such an organization points the 
importance given to the Turkic communities and deviance from the one dimensional pro-
Western identity of Turkey. 
In the third chapter, the systemic changes and their effects on Turkish identity are 
projected. With the demise of the Soviet Union, Communism threat is abolished and Turkey‟s 
role as the barrier of Communism came to an end. However, the new order produced new 
parameters and Turkey redefined her position according to the developments. With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, power vacuums occurred. Turkey found new places for 
maneuver. She became able to pursue multi-dimensional policies. In Central Asia and 
Caucasus, Turkey consolidated cultural relations with the emphasis of common Turkic identity. 
In Balkans, she tried to maintain stability and strengthen the relations on common historical 
grounds; that is the Ottoman legacy. The importance of Middle East increased and in a sense 
Turkey rediscovered the Arab world. The US model “an exemplary moderate Islamic state” 
worked well and democratic Turkey is regarded as the role model for the Muslim Arab world. 
Turkey placed stake on her Islamic identity in her relations with Middle East. While the parallel 
interests with US enhanced Turkey‟s position in some spheres, Turkey showed that her primary 
role is not the faithful ally of West/US, but can act as an independent actor. Security concept is 
redefined and the issues such as migration and terrorism emerged as the vital threats than of 
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conventional military threats for Europe and US. The soft power dimension is added to hard 
power. Soft power is defined as the ability to make the others want what you want to do. In this 
context, cultural and identical issues, values, moral principles are paid attention more than ever. 
From this perspective, the system has led Turkey to identify herself in a different concept than 
„Western states‟. 
What is acquired is that the explanation of the change in the Turkey‟s identical stance 
needs a comprehensive analysis. One should not simply state that it is because of the 
conservative character of AKP without looking to the state and systemic images. Likewise, it is 
not accurate to interpret the new position of Turkey as “EU lost Turkey”. Similarly, it is not all 
about the changes in the system. It is possible that, if the ruling party was not AKP, such shift 
in the identity might not have occurred in the same new world order. All in all, in order to 
understand Turkey‟s position toward EU it is required to examine all three levels. The change 
in the identical stance of Turkey in the EU accession period has reasons in different layers. 
Taking one level out would lead to miscalculations and misperceptions. 
In the light of the outcomes of this research and by looking into the recent developments 
(i.e. general elections of Turkey on 12
nd
 of June 2011 and the ongoing turmoil in the Middle 
East), it would be acceptable to forecast that this trend will preserve its pace.  In line with the 
structure of the thesis, reviewing three levels can be helpful to acquire some assumptions. 
With the victory of AKP with half of the votes on 12
nd
 of June 2011, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan remained as the Prime Minister for the third term and Ahmet Davutoğlu is going to 
work as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. There is no sigh that character or line of thought has 
changed. Rather, in his speech just after the victory of the elections, Erdoğan stated: 
Believe me, today Sarajevo winned as much as İstanbul; Beirut 
winned as much as İzmir; Damascus winned as much as Ankara; 
Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza winned much 
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as Diyarbakır. Today, Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans and Europe 
winned as much as Turkey. Today peace, justice and stability winned 
as much as democracy and freedom. 
Erdoğan in the abovementioned speech did not highlighted cities –even did not mentioned one- 
like Brussels, London or Paris; but he mentioned cities in Balkans and Middle East. More 
specifically, he put emphasis on Middle East and listed major cities of Palestine. As stated 
before, Balkans and Middle East refer to the Ottoman heritage and indicates the neo-Ottoman 
diplomacy. Keeping in mind that the Turkey‟s Israeli relations are in one of the most 
problematic eras, his stress on the Palestinian cities must be well read. He aims to keep his 
popularity among the Arab world which he had reached its peak in the “one-minute” incident. 
It is not only adressing Arab world; but it is about embracing the Islamic states and highling the 
Muslim brotherhood. By this way, it can be said that he had drew the frame of the Turkey‟s 
identity path and Turkish foreign policy. It is acquired that he confirmed ongoing stance of 
Turkey is going to be preserved. The former Ottoman geography and the Islamic countries will 
be put emphasis and the commonalities between them and Turkey will be revealed. Contrary to 
the critiques to force the pace with EU, Erdoğan underlined the significance of the „rest‟, 
instead of the „West‟. To sum up, the individual level shows that the same pattern will be 
pursued by the leaders. 
 When we come to the state level, we see that the reasons mentioned above are expected 
to continue. The Euro-skepticism does not seem to come to an end in the near future due to the 
continuing negative stance of the particular EU states. The economic performance of Turkey 
forecasted to improve in opposed to crisis-hit EU states. Embracing various modernities issue 
also seem to keep on with the activities of newly established institutes (Yunus Emre Institute 
and TRCA). 
 Systemic image is the level where changes rarely occur. In other words, the demise of 
the bipolar world opened a new era and it is not simple for a tremendous change to occur once 
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more. Since the system remains the same, Turkey is expected to preserve its multi-dimensional 
foreign policy. To sum, it seems that Turkey is going to proceed constructing and projecting 
her identity in this way - at least in the short term. However, it does not mean that Turkey has 
turned down her back on West or EU. Neither has she denied the „Western values/identity‟. In 
fact, it is the „Western identity‟ which makes Turkey so unique and so appreciated in the 
neighbor regions. Her success lays in making democracy, secularism, human rights and Islam 
cohabit. Modern face of Turkey is the principal element that boosts her soft power. Turkey‟s 
EU vision locates as the point of attraction. Thus, relations with EU should remain as one of the 
primary issues in the foreign policy agenda. EU membership vision should not be 
underestimated.  
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ANNEX I 
 
Yunus Emre Enstitüsü Başkanı Prof. Dr. Ali Fuat BİLKAN ile Görüşme 
Görüşmeyi gerçekleştiren: Çağlayan Çetin 
 
 
Çağlayan Çetin: İspanyolların Cervantes gibi, Almanların Goethe Enstitüsü gibi, 
Türkiye’nin de bir kültür enstitüsü olmalı tartışmaları bir süredir vardı. Yunus Emre 
Enstitüsü neden şimdi kuruldu? Neden şimdiye kadar kurulmadı? Şimdi kurulmuş 
olmasında Türkiye’de ve dünyadaki ne gibi gelişmeler etkili oldu? 
Prof. Dr. Ali Fuat Bilkan: Aslında bu yeni bir şey değil. Enstitünün kurulması veya Yunus 
Emre Vakfı‟nın bir enstitü kurması fikri çok önceden, yaklaşık 15 yıldır, belki daha da önceden 
beri, hep dillendirilen bir olaydı. “Niçin British Council, Cervantes gibi bir merkezimiz yok?” 
konusu çeşitli bakanların, devlet büyüklerimizin sürekli gündeme getirdikleri bir konuydu. 
Fakat şimdiki Cumhurbaşkanımızın Dışişleri Bakanı olduğu dönemde yoğunlaşan bir 
çalışmayla, Atilla Koç Bey‟in Kültür Bakanı olduğu dönemde, Mustafa İsen Bey‟in Kültür 
Bakanlığı Müsteşarı olduğu dönemde bu çalışmalar meclise taşındı. 5653 sayılı kanunla böyle 
bir vakıf kuruldu. Kuruldu ama bir seneye yakın, vakfın ne yapacağı, nasıl teşkilatlanacağı ile 
ilgili tereddütler meydana geldi. Tabi ki geç kalınmış bir proje. Bunu ben kabul ediyorum. Ama 
bunun direkt olarak Türkiye‟nin son dönemde gelişen dış politika argümanlarıyla tamamen 
ilintisiz olduğunu söylemek de yanlış olur. Türkiye son yıllarda yurtdışında ciddi anlamda 
politik duruş sergiledi. Onun da çok ciddi özellikleri var. Bu kurum bir kanun ile kuruldu. Bu 
kanunun amaç maddesinde “Türkiye‟yi, kültürel mirasını, Türk dilini, kültürünü, sanatını 
tanıtmak Türkiye‟nin diğer ülkelerle dostluğunu geliştirmek, kültürel alışverişini artırmak, 
bununla ilgili yurtiçi ve dışındaki bilgi ve belgeleri dünyanın istifadesine sunmak, Türk dili ve 
kültürü ile ilgili eğitim almak isteyenlere yurtdışında hizmet vermek” maddeleri yer alıyor. 
Bakın yurtdışında diyor, yurtiçinde demiyor. Orada bir vurgu var. Türkiye‟de Yunus Emre 
Araştırma Enstitüsü ve yurtdışında Yunus Emre Türk Kültür Merkezini açmak. Bu amaçla 
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Yunus Emre Vakfı bir enstitü açtı. Bu şuna benziyor: TOBB ETÜ nasıl bir vakfın kurduğu bir 
üniversite ise artık hiç kimse vakfın ismini zikretmiyor. Mesela TOBBEV diye bir vakfımız var 
ama kimse vakfın adını bilmez. Veya Bilkent Vakfı‟nı ya da Sabancı Vakfı‟nı değil, Sabancı 
Üniversitesi‟ni bilinir. Vakıf, enstitüyü kurdu ve enstitü kısa zamanda önce Ankara Ulus‟taki 
tarihi bir binanın restorasyonu biter bitmez taşındık. Vakıf da bir devlet vakfı olduğu için, 
tamamen devlet denetimine tabi. Maliye Bakanlığı‟nın denetimi altında. Hatta biraz daha ileri 
bir denetleme mekanizması bulunuyor.  İktidar partisini temsilen bir kişi, ana muhalefet 
partisini temsilen bir kişi, Dışişleri Bakanlığı‟nı temsilen bir kişi, Kültür Bakanlığı‟nı temsilen 
bir kişi ve maliye başmüfettişinden oluşan beş kişilik bir denetleme kurulu var. Ayrıca Vakıflar 
Genel Müdürlüğü‟nün denetimi var. Bir de özel şirket denetimi var. Yani vakıf bu noktada 
diğer vakıf ve kuruluşlara benzemeyen sivil bir denetime tabi. Mütevelli heyeti başkanı, 
Dışişleri Bakanı iken Sayın Abdullah Gül‟dü. Daha sonra Ali Babacan Bey, şimdi Ahmet 
Davutoğlu var. Toplam dört bakan bulunuyor.  
Evet, geç kalınmış bir proje; fakat bu geç kalmak bizim çok da önümüze bir engel olarak 
çıkmadı. Çünkü biz hızlı bir şekilde kurumsal kimliğimizi tamamlamak noktasında çalışmalara 
başladık. Arnavutluk‟ta Belçika‟da Bosna‟da merkezlerimi açtık. 
 
Ben de bunu soracaktım. Yer seçimlerinde ilk olarak neye dikkat ettiniz? Nelere öncelik 
verdiniz? 
 
Öncelik ihtiyaçlara göre belirlendi. Bölgesel ihtiyaçlara bakıyoruz. Mesela, ilk kültür merkezini 
açtığımız yer Bosna Hersek. Saraybosna‟da açtık. Çünkü Bosna Hersek bizim kültür 
tarihimizin, kültür coğrafyamızın tabii bir uzantısı. Yani, bir insanın kıyıda kuma kendisi 
gömdürüp eline ta uzak bir yerden çıkarması gibi bir şey. O bedenin bir parçası. Kültür havzası 
var. Siyasi sınırlar var, bir de kültürel sınırlar var.  
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Kültürel sınırlarınız sizin Endonezya‟ya kadar da gider, Moğolistan‟a kadar da gider. 
Macaristan bizim kültür sınırlarımızın önemli bir merkezidir. Türkiye‟nin İslam coğrafyası, 
Türk coğrafyası… Dışişleri Bakanımızın güzel bir tanımı vardır. Diyor ki “Türkiye hem bir 
Kafkas ülkesidir, Karadeniz Ülkesidir, Orta Asya ülkesidir, hem bir Orta Doğu ülkesidir, bir 
Akdeniz ülkesidir, bir Balkan ülkesidir ve aynı zamanda bir Avrupa ülkesidir.” Dolayısıyla 
Türkiye‟nin konumu, Türkiye‟nin tarihi, Türkiye‟nin kültür coğrafyası, Türkiye‟nin tarihi 
hafızası bizi “Nerelerde, hangi ülkelerde başlayalım?” sorusuna karar vermede bir ölçüde 
zorluyor. Ama buna başlarken, görüyorsunuz sürekli karşımda tutuyorum listeyi. (Hemen 
karşıdaki beyaz tahtayı gösteriyor.) Mesela, Cakarta‟da açmak gerekiyor mu, Madrid‟de 
gerekiyor mu, Moskova‟da gerekiyor mu? Bunları sorgulamak gerekiyor. Çünkü biz Türk ve 
Akraba Topluluklara ya da İslam coğrafyasına hitap eden bir kurum değiliz. Öyle bir iddiamız 
yok. Onunla ilgili İslam Konferansı var, Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı 
kuruldu. Ayni nakdi yardımlar, alt yapı yardımları, teknik yardımlar ile ilgili TİKA var. Fakat 
biz bir kültür merkeziyiz. Kültür merkezi olma hüviyetimiz; ırk, dil, din, coğrafya ayırt 
etmeksizin, Türk kültürünü, yemek kültürünü, sinema kültürünü, müziğini, plastik sanatları, 
tiyatrosunu, Türk dilini, edebiyatını, dünyanın dört bir tarafına, tanıtım amaçlı ya da o ülkelerde 
duyulan ihtiyaçlara cevap verecek biçimde ulaştırmak. Bunların içerisinde Peru da var mesela. 
Bir ay içerisinde Peru-Lima‟da bir şube açıyoruz. Levhası bile hazır: “Lima Yunus Emre Türk 
Kültür Merkezi”. 
 
Neden Peru’da peki? Diğer yerleri anlayabiliyorum, Balkan coğrafyası ya da Brüksel, 
Londra Türk yoğunluklu şehirler. Peru neden? 
 
Aslında ben de tam tersini düşünüyorum. Niçin Kazakistan, niçin kendi yakın coğrafyamızda 
oyalanıyoruz? Neticede Türkiye bu coğrafyada zaten Türk sinemasıyla, dizi filmleriyle, futbol 
takımıyla, yemek kültürüyle, Türkiye‟nin elli küsür ülkeyle yaptığı anlaşma gereği vizesiz 
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seyahatler zaten kendi kendini tanıtıyor. Yani Suriye‟ye kendimizi tanıtmalıyız ama Suriye 
zaten iki adımlık yer. Sabah gelip Gaziantep‟ten alışveriş yapıp arabalarını doldurup 
dönülebilinecek bir yer. Ama Peru öyle değil, Brezilya öyle değil, Çin, Endonezya öyle değil. 
Demek istediğim, bizim kendi kültür coğrafyamızda kendimizi bir taraftan tanıtırken bir de hiç 
gitmediğimiz, uğraşmadığımız, Türkiye ile ilgili hiçbir fikir sahibi olmayan başka ülkelerle, 
başka coğrafyalarda da tanışmamız gerekiyor. Bir taraftan kendi kültür coğrafyamız, bir 
taraftan büyük devletler ve dünya kültür başkentlerinde Türk kültürünün sergilenmesi; Paris, 
Londra, Brüksel, belki New York gibi . Buralarda olmamız çok önemli. Bir taraftan da 
Türkiye‟nin kendi kültürünü, sanatını hiç taşımadığı bazı ülkelerde tanıtım. Mesela şimdi 
elimde Estonya‟dan gelen bir yazı var. Estonya bizim için ne ifade ediyor etmiyor tartışılır ama 
Estonya‟da Tartu Üniversitesi Felsefe Fakültesi Dil Merkezi Bölüm Başkanı mektup yazmış ve 
mutlaka Tartu Üniversitesi‟nde bir Yunus Emre Kültür Merkezi açılmasını talep ediyor. Biz 
sadece gidip ülkelerde devasa binalar kiralayıp kültür merkezleri açmıyoruz. Biz aynı zamanda 
Türkçeyi de yabancı dil olarak öğretelim ve yabancı diller fakültesi içerisinde bir Türkçe 
kürsüsü de olsun taleplerini de karşılıyoruz ve buraya bir bütçe bağlıyoruz. Bunu için mesela 
Varşova Üniversitesi‟nde yeni bir yer açtık. Köln Üniversitesi‟nde açıyoruz. Protokoller 
senatodan geçiyor. Beyaz Rusya‟da bir yer açıyoruz. Estonya‟da bunu kabul edeceğiz. Peru‟da 
yine bir üniversite içerisinde, İnka Üniversitesi‟nde açıyoruz. Dolayısıyla bu model; sadece 
gidip güzel bir meydanda Yunus Emre Türk Kültür Merkezi açmak değil; aynı zamanda 
talepleri değerlendirmek. Bizden bu tür istekte bulunan kurum ve kuruluşların isteklerine 
duyarsız kalmamak durumundayız. 
  
Enstitü amacı “Türk kültürünün, tarihinin, dilinin ve edebiyatının daha iyi tanıtılması ve 
öğretilmesi amacı”. Türk kültürü nedir, neleri kapsar? Bu konuda tartışma var. Türk 
kültürü ile tam olarak hangi alanları işaret ediyorsunuz? Aynı şekilde, Türk tarihinin 
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başlangıcı-sonu nedir? Türk kültürü derken çeşitli eleştirilere maruz kaldınız mı ya da bu 
konuda tartışmalar yapıldı mı? Nasıl tanımlarsınız? 
 
Benim alanım klasik dönem edebiyatı. Bütün yüksek lisans ve doktora çalışmalarımda 17.yy 
üzerine çalıştım. Dolayısıyla ben klasik metinleri de okuyup tarayabildiğim için kültür 
sürekliliğini daha yakından görebiliyorum. Türk kültürü, tarihin ilk dönemlerinden itibaren 
ürettiğimiz kültürdür. Bunu ne Osmanlı öncesi, ne Osmanlı sonrası diye dışlamak zorunda 
değiliz. Victor Hugo‟ya sormuşlar: “Romantizm 17.yüzyılda başladı üstadım ne diyorsunuz?” 
diye. Demiş ki “Yok ya, saat kaçta?”. Bunun gibi bir şey. İnsanoğlu var olduğu günden itibaren 
bir kültür üretmiştir. Bu kültür; ırklar, coğrafyalar, çeşitli tarihsel süreçler diye birbirinden 
farklılaşmıştır. Bizim ilk yazılı kaynaklarımızdan itibaren, tarihte ilk görünür olduğumuz 
tarihten itibaren ürettiğimiz ortaya koyduğumuz bir kültür vardır. Din, edebiyat, sanat, 
kendimize özgü inanç ve yaşam tarzları… O süreklilik içerisinde görmek lazım bunu. Bana 
göre bunu bir yerde kesip bir yeri dışlamak ideolojiktir. Hangi türden olursa olsun. Yanlıştır. 
İdeolojiler hiçbir zaman kültürel hareketliği yönetmemelidir. Bu zararlı bir şey olur. Sizin bir 
şeyi reddetmeniz, o şeyin olmadığı anlamına gelmez. Siz Göktürkleri kabul etmeyin; sizin 
probleminiz. Göktürklerin bundan etkilenmesi mümkün değil. Onlar tarihte varlar. Osmanlı 
önce-sonrası tamamen ideolojikti. Bugün de o tartışmalar bu nitelikte. Osmanlı bir dönemdir, 
Selçuklu da bir dönemdir. Bizim medeniyetimizin aslında hamuru -pek bilinmez ama- 
Selçuklar tarafından yoğrulmuştur. Osmanlı, Selçuklunun yoğurduğu hamur üzerine kurmuştur 
medeniyetini ya da kültürel dokusunu. Netice itibariyle Selçuklu bir uç beyidir Osmanlıda. Onu 
da kabul etmek gerekiyor. Fakat kültürel birikime dikkat ederseniz, özellikle 12. yüzyıldan 
sonra gelişen 13, 14, 15. yüzyıllara kadar gelişen yoğun mimari, musiki, edebiyat, sanat ve 
kültür zemininde Selçukluların muazzam bir birikimleri ve gayretleri var.   Bir de kültürü bu 
şekilde sadece Osmanlı, Selçuklu, Anadolu, Cumhuriyet diye ayırmamak lazım. Örneğin 
Memlükler var. Türk bunlar. Türkçe, Kıpçak Türkçesi konuşuyorlar. Timurlar var, Şiban Han 
117 
 
var. Safeviler Türk zaten. Türkçe edebiyatları, şiirleri var. Şah İsmail‟in Türkçe divanı var. 
Bunu biliyoruz. Öte taraftan Babür devleti var. Babürlerin muazzam bir kültürü edebiyatı sanatı 
var. Dünya mimarisinde çok önemli bir yeri olan Tac Mahal gibi mimari eserleri var. Demek 
istediğim, bunu bir dönemle coğrafyayla sınırlamak doğru değil. O yüzden ben Türk kültürü 
tarihten görüldüğümüz ilk günden bugüne kadar oluşturduğumuz ve dünya medeniyetine 
eklemlediğimiz katkıda bulunduğumuz bütün bir maddi manevi somut soyut kültür varlıkları 
olarak görüyorum. 
 
Yurtdışındaki faaliyetlerinizde nasıl yansıtıyorsunuz bu kültürü? Bir yanda son dönemde 
çıkan Türk filmleri festivali yapılıyor, öbür yandan hat, ebru, tezhip gibi faaliyetler yapılıyor. 
Hangi tarafa ağırlık veriliyor? 
 
Her ülke, her coğrafya, hatta ülkedeki bölgeler veya şehirler bile farklı bir kültür faaliyeti veya 
felsefesi ya da refleksi ihtiyacı doğuruyor. Yani sizin Şam‟da yapacağınız kültür faaliyeti ile 
Halep‟te, Tiran ile İşkodra‟da yapacağınız faaliyet fark ediyor. 
 
 Neye göre fark ediyor? 
Orada yaşayan nüfus bunu belirliyor. Mesela siz Bükreş‟te daha ziyade Romanyalı ya da 
Romen vatandaşlara yönelik çalışma yapabilirsiniz. Ama Köstence‟de Türk azınlık var, Türk 
azınlığın ihtiyaçları var. Priştina‟da Arnavut vatandaşların yoğun olduğu bir yer. Onlarla daha 
ziyade ortak kültür değerleri üzerine bir şeyler yapabilirsiniz veya Türkiye‟yi tanıtırsınız. Ama 
Prizren‟de Türk çocukların folklor ihtiyaçları, Türkçe şarkı, korolar kurma, tiyatro grubu kurma 
ihtiyaçları var. Farklı coğrafyalarda, ülkelerde, bölgelerde, şehirlerde çok farklı talepler var. 
Bosna Hersek‟te yapacağınız faaliyet ile Hırvatistan‟da yapacağınız faaliyet arasında farklar 
var. Hırvatistan‟da modern Türkiye‟yi tanıtmak zorundasınız. Ama Bosna‟da bir Müslüman 
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kitle var ve Boşnaklar bizimle ortak kültür değerlerine sahip insanlar. Ebru öğrenmek istiyorlar, 
Türkçe şiir okumak istiyorlar. Öbür tarafta Hırvatistan‟da belki Türkçe daha ziyada sektörel 
öğretilebilir. Hırvatistan, Türklerin son zamanlarda tatil beldesi olarak gördüğü ülkelerden biri. 
Suriye‟de iş için Türkçe öğrenen bir çoğunluk var. Biz bunların hepsinin istatistiklerinin 
çıkarıyoruz. Niçin Türkçe öğrenmek istediklerini araştırıyoruz. Mesela Bosna Hersek Tuzla‟da 
bir şişecam fabrikası açılıyor ve orada iş bulmak için ciddi bir Türkçe öğrenme talebi çıkıyor. 
Türkçe öğrenmeyi artık bir kültürü başka bir kültür üzerine yaymak diye algılamamak lazım. 
Çok yanlış olur. Dünyada ekonomik kaygılar birçok şeyi belirliyor aslında. Bunu biz de 
görüyoruz. Fakat sadece ekonomik kaygıların belirleyici olduğunu söylemek de yanlış. Çünkü 
bazen çok yoksul bir ülke, bir müzikle, bir kültür programıyla çok ön plana çıkabiliyor. Biz 
yıllarca Brezilya dizileri izledik. Bugün de Ortadoğu, Uzak doğu, Orta Asya, Balkanlar, Türk 
dizileri izliyorlar. Geçenlerde Makedonya Kültür Bakanı‟yla bir görüşmem vardı. “Ben Binbir 
Gece‟ye hayranım hep seyrediyorum” dedi. Ben Binbir Gece‟yi hiç seyretmemiştim. Bu 
konuda o bölgenin, o coğrafyanın sizden beklentileri önemli. O coğrafyaya elbette modern 
Türkiye‟nin gücünü, imkanlarını, turizm bölgelerini anlatmak gerekir. Sadece o bölgede gidip 
bir ebru kursu ya da resim sergisi açmıyoruz. Aynı zamanda Türkiye‟yi bir eğitim adası haline 
getirmek için Türk üniversitelerinin broşürlerini eğitim sergilerine katılarak buralarda 
sergiliyoruz. Türkiye‟de dünyanın dört bir tarafına eğitim için koşturan gençler niçin 
Türkiye‟yi tercih etmesinler? Türkiye‟de de yabancı dil eğitimi var. Gelirler, daha iyi bir 
imkânla Türkiye‟de eğitim görürler. Önümüzdeki günlerde Türkiye‟deki tatil yörelerinin belli 
başlı yerleri tanıtım broşürlerini de kendi merkezimizde barındıracağız. Türk Hava Yolları, 
TOBB, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı sponsorlarımız arasında. Dolayısıyla bu sene yaklaşık iki 
yüz civarında Türkçe öğrenen genci bütün masraflarını ödeyerek Türkiye‟ye tatil amaçlı 
getireceğiz. Yaklaşık yirmi üniversite ile anlaştık. Onlar kampüslerini açacaklar. Yirmişer, 
otuzar kişi alacağız. Mesela Eskişehir Anadolu Üniversitesi, Türk Folklor grupları oynayan 
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öğrencileri ağırlayacak. İstanbul Üniversitesi, Selçuk Üniversitesi, Nevşehir Üniversitesi, 
Çankırı Üniversitesi ile anlaşmalar yaptık. Mesela Çankırı‟ya Amerikalıları getireceğiz. 
Türkiye‟deki tabii hayatı, köy hayatını görecekler. İmece usulünü, insanları, kültürü, dokuyu 
tanıyacaklar. Herhangi bir batı ülkesindeki batı tarzıyla bizim büyük şehirlerimiz arasında fark 
kalmadı artık. Nevşehir‟e özellikle arkeoloji okuyan öğrencileri göndereceğiz. Topyekûn bütün 
kurumlarla bir şeyler yapmaya çalışıyoruz. O yüzden ihtiyaçlara, taleplere, ülkemizden 
beklentilere bakıyoruz. O ülkelerde, mesela Balkanlarda ciddi bir işsizlik söz konusu. Bizim 
politikamızın bir tarafı da bu insanlara acaba nasıl bir teknik eğitim imkânı sağlayabiliriz diye 
düşünmek. Bizdeki İşkur‟la, Kosgep‟le, Tika‟yla bunlara teknik ara eleman yetiştirme 
konusunda bazı imkânlar sağlayabilir miyiz? Bu doğrudan bizim görev alanımız olmayabilir. 
Ancak, siz doktor değilsiniz ve yanınızda bir insan yere düşerse doktor olup olmanız önemli 
değildir. Sizin ona yardıma koşmanız gerekiyor. 
 
Kültürü öğrenmeden, dizilerden bahsettik. Kurumun internet sayfasını inceledim. 
Bültenlerinizde Türkçe öğrenenlerin çok fazla nedeni var deniyor. Örneğin kimi Türk biriyle 
evlenmek için, kimi Türkçe müzikleri, dizileri anlamak için Türkçe öğrenmeye başlamış. Bu 
şekilde kültürel entegrasyon sağlanabilir mi sizce? Batı’da var olan “biz ve Müslümanlar” 
ya da İslam coğrafyasında var olan “biz ve Batı” ayrımı kırılabilir mi sizce? Ya da en baştan 
böyle bir ayrımın olduğunu kabul eder misiniz? 
Biz ve ötekiler diye bir şeye ben inanmıyorum. İnsanlar birbirlerini tanıdıkça ortaklıklar benzer 
yönler fark ediyorlar. Ancak genel olarak böyle bir algı mutlaka var. Bizim coğrafyamıza 
yönelik çok daha farklı şeyler var. Benim Amerika‟da tanıştığım bir Ermeni arkadaşım, 
“Türkiye‟de bir süre kalabilir miyim?” diye bana sordu. Ermeni ama Amerikalı, Amerika‟da 
yaşıyor. Ben de memnuniyetle kabul ettim. Türkiye‟de misafir ettim. Gitmek istediği yerleri, 
Sivas, Urfa, Mardin…dolaştırdık.  Amerika‟ya döneceği sırada bana enteresan bir şey söyledi: 
“Bizim hiç problemimiz yok aslında. Birbirimize çok benziyoruz” dedi. Bakın bu çok 
enteresan. Hatta bana “dağın öteki yüzü diye bir resim sergisi açsak, Türk ve Ermeni ressamları 
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bir araya getirsek” diye bir teklifte bulundu. Bu arkadaşım mühendisken Ermeni cemaati onu 
antropoloji okumaya ikna etmiş. Antropoloji okuyordu, doktorasını yapıyordu. Ve belki 
Türkiye çalışmaları konusunda çok sivri yetiştireleceği bir rol üstlenecekti. Fakat bu insan bile 
Türkiye‟yi, Türk insanını tanıdıktan sonra düşünceleri değişti. Bu insanı Urfa‟da damda 
yatırmışlar. Çiğköfteler, kebaplar, ayranlar… İnsanlar misafirimiz diye ağırlamış ve hiç 
dışlanmamış. Ondaki algı “Bunlar babalarımızı kestiler, dedelerimizi kestiler” şeklindeydi. 
Düşmanlık ve kin olsa, o kin devam ederdi mutlaka. İnsanlar tuhaf karşılarlardı, resmi 
davranırlardı. Olmadı. Kendi evinde misafir etmiş, otele bırakmamış, arabasıyla dolaştırmış 
vesaire. Bunu gördükten sonra bir şeyler kırılıyor. Biz de aynı durumdayız. Benim Amerikalı 
arkadaşlarım var. Buraya geldiklerinde burada kalmak, buraya yerleşmek, Türklerle evlenmek 
isteyenler oldu. Baktım ki bir Amerika yok, birkaç Amerika var. Bir Fransa yok,  birkaç Fransa 
var. Bir Türkiye yok, birkaç Türkiye var. Bizim o tek boyutlu Türkiye algısını “Hayır, sizin o 
bildiğiniz Türkiye sadece şuralarda çıkan, çocukların taş attığı, polislerin göz yaşartıcı 
bombalarla karşılık verdiği görüntüler değil” dememiz gerekiyor. Türkiye‟nin kıyıları var, 
Türkiye‟nin İstanbul‟u var. Türkiye‟nin gazeteleri var, aydınları var, modern yüzü, modern 
hayatı var. Birkaç mevsim gibi birkaç Türkiye var. Bu çeşitliliği en azından gösterebilirsek, o 
tek boyutlu Türkiye algısını kırabilirsek “ben Türkiye‟yi böyle bilmiyordum” deyip dönenler 
daha da artacaktır. Geçen gün Washington‟da bir toplantıda yanıma biri geldi. Teksas‟ta 
senatörmüş. “Ben Hıristiyanlığı Türklerden öğrendim. İzmir‟de dolaştım, Efes‟i, Meryem 
Ana‟yı dolaştım. Dinimle ilgili bilgiyi, tarihimizi oradan öğrendim” dedi. O yüzden bu ülkeye 
ne kadar çok gazeteci, aydın, yazar, ressam, şair, üniversite öğrencisi, doktora öğrencisi, 
akademisyen varsa, bu ülkenin böyle tek boyutlu bir ülke olmadığını, tek bir yüzünün 
olmadığını, çok fazla okunabildiğini ve okumalara açık olduğunu gösterebilirlerse, o kadar 
puan kazanırız. 
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Bahsettiğiniz çok karakterli yapısından dolayı Türkiye’ye gelenlerin Türkiye algıları da 
değişiyor, İslam dünyası ile ilgili algıları da değişiyor diyebilir miyiz?   
Biz sık sık yurtdışına gittiğimiz için daha iyi gözlemliyoruz yabancıların bakışlarını. Siz 
gelmeden önce Amerika‟da bir akademisyene bir mail atıyordum. New York‟ta Seton Hall diye 
bir diplomasi okulu var. Bana “Ben bir sonraki toplantının Londra‟da olmasını değil; 
İstanbul‟da olmasını diliyorum. Bu konuda da ısrar edeceğim” diye yazmış. Çünkü biz orada 
resmi toplantı dışındaki saatlerde de hep şunu konuştuk: “Türkiye Ortadoğu için çok çok 
önemli bir modeldir”. Amerika‟daki aydınların zihninde bu oturmuş bir şey. Neden? Bir 
taraftan Müslümanlık İslamiyet var, bir taraftan da modern hayatı yaşama özgürlüğü var. Ve o 
özgürlüğü insanlar yüz yıldır yaşıyorlar. Bakmayın Cumhuriyet‟ten önce de, Tanzimat‟tan 
itibaren, onlarda olmayan ama bizde olan haklar vardı. Belçika‟ya, Fransa‟ya Almanya‟ya bir 
Türk‟ün gidip yerleşmesi için hala çok ciddi engeller var. Dilden şu puan alınacak, bu şartlar 
yerine getirilecek. Türkiye‟de böyle bir şey yok. İnsanlar geliyorlar, örneğin Antalya‟dan ev 
alıyorlar. Kıyılara, Fethiye‟ye bir İngiliz aile yazın geliyor, üç dört ay kalıyor. Hatta muhtar 
oluyorlar. Ruslar, İngilizler, çok sayıda Alman muhtarlığı kazandılar. Biz Türkiye‟yi 
görmüyoruz. Biraz haksızlık ediyoruz kendimize. Dünyaya çıktığınızda çok daha fazla 
tedirginlik yaşıyorsunuz. Amerika‟da bir vize başvurusu yaptığınızda, psikolojik bir baskı 
çekiyorsunuz. Burada iki dakika kuyrukta bekleyen insan sabırsızlanıyor, polise saldırıyor. 
Ama Amerika‟da yaşlı genç iki saat ve ayakta bekliyor. Bu ülkeye haksızlık etmemek lazım. 
Bu coğrafyada muazzam bir şey bu. Çünkü bu coğrafyada Mısır olmak vardı kaderde, Suriye, 
Cezayir, İran olmak vardı. Ama olmadı burası; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti oldu. Cumhuriyeti ve 
Cumhuriyet‟in ürettiği değerleri ortaya koyduğu, insanımıza kazandırdığı erdemleri bence çok 
iyi algılamak lazım. Çünkü o ülkelere gittiğinizde burayı görüyorsunuz. 
 
Ben de geçen ay Belçika’ya gittim. Arkadaşlarımı ziyaret etmek için bir haftalık bir fırsatım 
oldu. Vize almakta gerçekten çok zorlandım. Ailemin tüm malvarlığına kadar, her şeyi 
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gösterdim. En sonunda vize aldım. Bu sefer de “Döndüğünüz zaman elçiliğe uğrayın, 
döndüğünüzü kanıtlamak için imza atın.” dediler. Sanki gözaltındaymışım gibi, terörist gibi 
kendimi çok kötü hissetmiştim. 
Ve burası Avrupa Birliği‟nin başkenti. Bence Türk aydının bu “biz adam olmayız, bak adamlar 
yapmış” kompleksinden çıkması lazım. Fransa‟ya gittiğinizde sizi kuyruğa diziyorlar, köpekler 
vesaireler ile. İngiltere‟de ülkeden ayrılırken bütün güvenlik şeritlerinden geçtikten sonra 
THY‟nin kapısında beklerken gelip köpeklerle çantalarınızı yokluyorlar. Bizim bu ülkeye 
inanmamız lazım. Başka türlü olmayacak. 
 
Bu açıdan bakıldığında Huntington’ın “Bir medeniyet dönüşümü geçirmek isteyen Türkiye, 
katılmak istediği medeniyet tarafından reddedilmektedir.” sözünü nasıl 
değerlendiriyorsunuz? Son dönem AB ilişkileriyle bunu ilişkilendirebilir miyiz? 
 
AB konusunun Türkiye‟de çok abartıldığına inananlardanım. AB aşırı derecede sanki bir milat 
gibi algılanıyor. Bu siyasi, kültürel, daha ziyade ekonomik – zaten mantığı ve kuruluşu 
itibariyle ekonomik bir oluşum. Ekonomik işbirliğine katılmak isteyenler için bir kulübe aday 
olmak gibi bir şey. Kulübe aday olmak istediğinizde sizden bir takım belgeleri, fotoğrafınızı, 
banka hesaplarınızı, mal varlığınızı getirmenizi isterler. Bu da onun gibi. Türkiye bu şartları 
yerine getirirse burada yer alır. Ama bu şartları yerine getirmezse burada yer almaz. Türkiye 
200 yıldır batı dünyasının normlarına ve çağdaş dünyanın normlarına uyum sağlama evresi 
geçiriyor. Bu cumhuriyetle başlamadı. Bu II. Mahmut‟la beraber belki, ondan evvel de vardı 
belki. II. Mahmut‟la beraber hızlandı, bunu kabul etmek lazım. Pantolonu ilk giyen padişah, 
düşünün. Fatih resmini yaptırıyor Batılı ressamın karşısında. Devlet dairelerine II. Mahmut 
resmini astırıyor. Bunlar çok enteresan şeyler ve iki yüz sene evvel olan değişimler. Türkiye bu 
değişimleri niye yaşadı, niye yapıyor? Türkiye bu coğrafya itibariyle kendi bünyesinde bulunan 
farklı din, dil, kültür, ırk mensuplarının daha özgür bir ortamda yaşaması için peş peşe bir çok 
kanun çıkardı. Tanzimat bunlardan biridir. Azınlıklara verilen haklar, Tanzimat‟la verilen 
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haklar, şimdi Yunanistan‟da Türklere verilmemiştir. Bizim Tanzimat‟la gerçekleştirdiğimiz 
devrim pek çok yerde yok. Sadece Türkler için demiyorum, köle gibi çalıştırdıkları sonra 
başlarına bela edip geri kovamadıkları Afrikalı azınlıkları hala üçüncü sınıf insan gibi 
görüyorlar. Bir medeniyet çatışması yaratılmak isteniyor. Bu doğrudur. Vardır demiyorum. 
Yaratılmak isteniyor. Bu yapılan bir şey. Olan bir şey değil. 
 
Sürekli bunun dillendirilmesi, bir proje gibi diyorsunuz. 
Huntington‟ın Medeniyetler Çatışması tezini aslında siyasi bir çerçevede görmek lazım. 
Aslında başta Amerika‟nın çektiği bir grubun ve dünyada çok sayıda mensubu olan bir bloğun 
bunu sürekli dillendirdiğini ve şuur altında bunu gizlediğini görüyoruz. Haçlı Seferi diye 
adlandırıldı ilk Irak saldırıları. Amerika‟nın Irak‟a savaş açmasına Sarkozy de Haçlı Seferi 
dedi. Batının şuur altında böyle bir zihniyet mevcut. Dünyayı sürekli iki kutbun çatışmasına 
doğru çekmek isteyen, hala o haçlı seferi zihniyeti. Çünkü Haçlı Seferi‟nde Doğu ve Batı vardı. 
Doğu zındıktı, ezilmesi gerekiyordu, yok edilmesi gerekiyordu. Bir de Batı medeniyeti vardı. 
Doğu ile Batı arasında bir mücadele vardı. Şimdi iki kutuplu dünyadan koptuk diyorlar. 
Rusya‟nın Glasnost‟sundan, Perestroika‟sından sonra, iki kutuplu dünya olmadan dengeyi 
kuramayacakları ve bir düşman olmadan hiçbir güç ve kudret sergileyemeyeceğini bildiği için, 
Batı dünyası, karşısında bir kutup oluşturmak istiyor.  
O düzene mi alışılmış? 
Evet, Amerikalılar böyle bir zihni kurguya sahiptir. Bir düşman algısı olacak. Askeriyede 
vardır: mavi kuvvetler, kırmızı kuvvetler. Üçüncü bir kuvvet yoktur. Hani bir de sarı kuvvet 
araya girsin, onları uzlaştırsın diye bir şey yok. Mavi ve kırmızıdır; başka bir şey yok. Bu algı 
yanlıştır. Dünyada bu algıyı yıkmak isteyen çok sayıda aktör de vardır. Türkiye‟nin İspanya ile 
başlattığı şu anda Bekir Karlı Bey‟in başında olduğu İstanbul‟da böyle bir kurum var. Bence 
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bunun yolu algıda değişiklik yaratmaktır. Yeni nesil bunları çok daha rahat görebiliyor. Çünkü 
artık internet çağında insanların gidip bir ülkeyi gezmesi de gerekmiyor. Belgesellerden, 
internetten haberleşip anlıyorsunuz. Kamboçya‟daki insanlık dışı zulmü bir cep telefonu 
kamerası çekip tüm dünyaya yayabiliyor. Ya da Mısır‟daki insan hakları ihlalini, Suriye‟deki 
ayaklanmanın izlerini yayabiliyor.  
Bu medeniyetler çekişmesi veya medeniyetler çatışmasına karşı yapılacak en önemli şey; 
çeşitliliği hala yaşıyor, hala içimizde o çeşitliliği hala barındırıyoruz mesajı vermektir. Biz 
bununla ilgili mesela Yunus Emre olarak Belçika‟da yakında bir sergi açıyoruz. Belçika‟nın en 
büyük kültür vakfı Bozar ve Belçika Kraliyet Vakfı ile birlikte ortaklaşa açacağız. Türkiye‟deki 
gayri Müslimlerin günlük hayatlarını ve dini ritüellerini tek tek resimledik ve belgesele 
dönüştürdük. Bunu önce Avrupa Parlamentosu‟nda açacağız. Avrupa Parlamentosu‟nda 
açtıktan sonra Bozar‟daki büyük sergi alanında sergileyeceğiz. Türkiye biraz tabii çevresi ile 
ilgilenmeye başladıktan sonra şunu da fark etti: Musevi Türkler var, Gagauz ya da Litvanya 
civarında Karaimler var. Hıristiyan Türkler var. Müslümanlar arasında çok farklı mezhepler 
gruplar inançlar ritüeller var. Türkiye‟de Süryaniler var. Hem de Güneydoğu‟da yaşıyorlar; dini 
ve etnik bağların en güçlü olduğu yerde. Bu insanlara belki bin senedir tahammül kültürü 
geliştirmişiz. Yerelleştirmişiz. Bayramda aynı Müslümanlar gibi sarılıyorlar, ayakkabılarını 
çıkarıp kiliselere giriyorlar. Bu medeniyetler çatışması tezi bana göre kıyamet senaryosuna 
bütün bir toplumu insanlığı hazırlama, o işi çabuklaştırma, hız kazandırma konusunda yapılmış 
hamlelerdi. Bu süreç kesinlikle tabii değildir. Çünkü biz birbirimizi tanıdıkça, birbirimize daha 
fazla yakınlık hissediyoruz. Yunan adalarında günlük teknelerle, alışverişini, yeşilliğini alıp 
geri dönen insanlar var. Kimsenin kimse ile doğal ortam içerisinde bir problemi yok. Ama 
problem oluşturma, problem yapma konusunda aktörler var diye düşünüyorum.  
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Yani artık iki kutuplu dünya ya da Batı medeniyeti tarzı modernleşmenin değil kendi 
içimizde de çeşitliliğin doğması ve bir nevi kendi standartlarını oluşturması söz konusu 
diyebilir miyiz? 
 
İnanılmaz derecede birbirimize benzedik zaten. Örneğin Polonya‟ya gittiğinizde öğle yemeği 
için McDonalds arıyorsunuz. Niye? McDonalds‟ı Türkiye‟den biliyorsunuz, daha yakın 
geliyor. Bilmemiz gereken nokta şu: İnsanlar gerçekten birbirine çok benzedi. Bu globalleşen 
dünya deniyor. Çeşitli kavramlar kullanılıyor; küreselleşen dünya, köyleşen dünya, iletişim 
araçları, internet... Düşüncede de kadın hakları, çocuk hakları, çocuk istismarı, kadına şiddet, 
insanların çevre sorunlarına duyarlılığı, trafik kurallarında anında birilerinin yaptığı hataları 
anında bildirme konularında hassasiyetler… Artık global sorunların global çözümlere ihtiyaç 
duyduğu dönemdeyiz. Giyim kuşamdan, yeme içme kültürüne kadar, Amerikalının bizden 
farklı bir yaşam tarzı yok. Arabasına biniyor, araba markası aynı, iş yerine gidiyor, kahvesini 
içiyor, biz de çay kahve içiyoruz, öğlen toplantısına gidiyor. Biz de aynı şeyi yapıyoruz. Bunu 
çok büyütmemek lazım. Gittikçe birbirine benzeyen hayat tarzları gelişiyor. Bu benzerlik öyle 
bir yere gelecek ki insanlar birbirlerini daha kolay anlayabilecekler.  Bizim de bir farkımız 
yok aslında. Biz de böyle yaşıyoruz.  
 
Günlük yaşamda şu an hepimiz aynı şekilde yaşıyoruz ama yine de Türk kültürü farklı bir 
şey olduğu için tanıtıyoruz.  
 
Değerler kalmıyor. Dünya birbirine benzerken değerler kalmıyor. Bu farklılık bazen insanın 
kimliğini ortaya koyan ve insana haz veren bir özellik taşıyor. Hep aynı yemeği yiyen, mesela 
hep pizza yiyen bir insanın bir ölçüde bir mahkûmun hayatından farklı olmadığı 
kanaatindeyim. Mahkûma tek yemek getirilir ve ne getirilse onu yer. Biz o çeşitliliği, o 
zenginliği, farklı kültürleri, birbirine benzeyen ama benzemeyen; fakat benzemediği yönüyle de 
cazip olan yönü çıkarmaya çalışıyoruz. Kültür politikaları da cazibeye dayanıyor alsında. Kamu 
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diplomasisinin anahtar kelimesi cazibe oluşturmaktır. Bir ülkenin, başka bir ülke, başka bir 
coğrafya, başa bir toplum, başka bir kültür üzerine cazibe oluşturmasıdır. Öyle tanımlıyoruz. 
Çok teşekkür ederim zamanınızı ayırdığınız için. Çok sağolun. 
Ben teşekkür ederim. Size çalışmalarınızda kolaylıklar diliyorum. 
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